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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The story of the Shasta Dam and of the Central Valley Project is a story about regional 
planning, ecology and agriculture. During the 1930s and 1940s, agricultural interests in 
California proposed an extensive irrigation project know as the Central Valley Project. This 
project was a major plan, decades in the making, which changed the way all Californians 
interacted with their environment. Though the primary goal of providing irrigation for 
agriculture succeeded, achieving that goal included significant costs, especially for the Central 
Valley Chinook salmon, Oncorhynchus tshawytscha. I will explore these issues in the context of 
conservation in the U.S. during the New Deal Era. This was a period when environmental 
consciousness in the U.S. was moving from conservation to environmentalism and ecology and 
was making large strides in knowledge. Understanding the Central Valley Project gives us 
insight into the conflicting ways scientists valued nature and how those values affected the 
eventual outcome of the Central Valley Project. Different stakeholders understood the policy 
problem in different ways, and tried to shape the outcome of the project.   
Shasta Dam, completed in 1945, comprised a key part of the Central Valley Project, 
which was designed to move water from the northern half of California to the dryer southern 
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half. Created by the dam, Lake Shasta would serve as a major source of the water that would be 
redistributed throughout California’s Central Valley. In addition to providing water to farmers, 
and electric power to urban dwellers, the dam also would have a major impact on the Central 
Valley Chinook salmon populations of the Sacramento River. The scientists and engineers who 
worked on the Central Valley Project knew about this impact, and a small team of biologists 
worked to devise a “salvage plan” for the salmon. However, major policy actors were focused 
on providing water to farmers and power to factories, and saving the salmon was clearly not a 
high priority for them. Even with the salvage plan, the dam had a large and negative impact on 
the fish.  
Understanding the story of the salmon salvage plan provides insight into changes in the 
conservation movement during the 1930s and ‘40s. The process of creating the plan shows us 
that while the American conservation movement was in a time of transition, arguments over 
wildlife helped shape those changes. Environmental historians tend to focus on times of great 
activism, such as the creation of the national parks or the beginning of Earth Day. But it is 
important to look at the times between these events to understand the smaller changes and 
events shaping discussions leading up to those major mile markers.   
The conservation movement in the early twentieth century is often seen through the 
lens of two controversial dams, Hetch Hetchy and Echo Park. In 1913 Congress authorized the 
flooding of the Hetch Hetchy Valley within Yosemite National Park to build a reservoir to supply 
water for San Francisco. But in 1956, after a hard fight from the Sierra Club and other 
environmentalists, Congress decided not to build Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur National 
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Monument near the Utah-Colorado border. The Echo Park Dam would have been part of the 
Colorado River Storage Project, intended to provide both water and power. Shasta Dam, built 
between 1938 and 1945, was constructed between those battles. Shasta Dam was not built in a 
federal reserve, so it was less controversial than either Hetch Hetchy or Echo Park. 
Nevertheless, it was a major dam with great environmental impacts. Thus understanding what 
happened at Shasta Dam helps us to understand why the outcomes of those two dam 
proposals were different.  
Californians had long envisioned a dam near the eventual site of the Shasta Dam. In 
1933 the California legislature passed the Central Valley Project Act which approved the Shasta 
Dam as well as two other dams and several canals. The project was intended to bring water to 
the southern part of the Central Valley, provide flood control, and produce electricity. The 
construction of Shasta Dam started in 1938. In the same year a study of ways to preserve the 
salmon run started. This analysis was quite late in the process of building the dam, and the 
efforts to save the salmon would have been on better footing if the study had begun earlier and 
helped to shape the design of Shasta Dam to a greater degree. 
The fisheries investigation was directed by Paul R. Needham. In 1940 his team had 
published a report on strategies to “salvage” the salmon runs. In the winter of 1942-1943, the 
dam reached a height that blocked the upstream migration of salmon. Needham’s team tried to 
mitigate the effects of blocking the salmon run but had many problems including having their 
trucks for transporting salmon confiscated by the army. Despite the fact that much of the plan 
was never put into practice, the biologists remained optimistic. In 1949 James W. Moffet 
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published a report on the state of the salmon runs in California Fish and Game, the journal of 
the California Department of Fish and Game, which stated that the fish were doing well. Moffet 
wrote, “Present ecological conditions in the Sacramento River are greatly improved for the 
natural production of salmonid fishes.”1 
While ecology eventually became a focal point for the environmental movement, at the 
time of the Shasta salvage project, ecology had not yet gained full recognition as a science, and 
its primary focus emphasized the succession of plant communities. The scientists working on 
the Central Valley project used ecological concepts, such as connectivity of nature and 
population biology, but did not consider themselves ecologists. Most self-identified as aquatic 
biologists. 2However, these scientists did see themselves as conservationists.  
The Central Valley Project did not by itself turn untouched wilderness into a human-
controlled disaster; instead it was part of a long series of changes. The Central Valley’s rivers 
had been highly modified before the project even began by years of nearby mining and 
agriculture, which began in the 1850s; both used large amounts of water and altered the 
watershed considerably. By the 1930s urban and industrial users, especially those concentrated 
in the San Francisco Bay Area, were also having a significant impact on California’s water 
systems. At the northern edge of the Bay along the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, industrial 
water users and municipalities were having trouble with brackish water that reached farther 
                                                          
1 James W. Moffett, “First Four Years of King Salmon Maintenance Below Shasta Dam, 
Sacramento River, California,” California Fish and Game 35 no 2 (1949): 102. 
2 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd ed, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 205-253. 
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and farther upstream as irrigation reduced the flow of fresh water into the Delta.3 Thus, the 
ecology of the Central Valley was quite different in 1933 than it had been in 1850. These 
changes had negatively impacted the salmon by clogging the streams with mud, blocking access 
to spawning grounds, polluting the waters with mining runoff, and reducing the water in many 
waterways making them an unsuitable habitat. Thus the salmon populations were declining 
even before Shasta Dam was built. 
Salmon are iconic, holding significance and meaning. People are generally most 
passionate about conserving charismatic species; salmon with their dramatic lifecycle are quite 
charismatic. Salmon are anadromous fish; they live out much of their lives at sea but return to 
fresh water streams to spawn. Salmon travel incredible distances to return and spawn in the 
streams where they were hatched. They need to find the same cool water and shallow gravel 
beds for nests when they return to the place where they began life. 4 The primary species of 
salmon found in California’s Central Valley is the Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha). 
Ecologists now divide the Sacramento salmon runs, populations that travel upstream every year 
at the same time, into four sections: Late Fall, Winter, Spring, and Fall. Runs are named for the 
                                                          
3 W. Turrentine Jackson and Alan M. Peterson, The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta The Evolution 
and Implementation of Water Policy: An Historical Perspective (Davis, CA: California Water 
Resources Center, 1977):1-5. 
4 David Yates et al. “Climate warming, water storage, and Chinook salmon in California’s 
Sacramento Valley,” Climatic Change 91 (2008): 337-338. 
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time when salmon enter the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.5 While Shasta Dam was being 
constructed, only two runs were recognized: Spring and Fall.6  
Robert de Roos, who wrote about the Central Valley Project in 1948, called the story of 
the salmon life cycle “romantic,” suggesting that salmon were popular at the time the Central 
Valley Project was being built. Still, de Roos framed his discussion of salmon in terms of dollars 
spent and benefits to sportsmen, neglecting the intrinsic or cultural values of salmon. De Roos 
also placed faith in the hatchery as a technical solution to the danger to salmon posed by dams. 
Still, de Roos had a good grasp on the problems dams posed to salmon. He recognized that 
dams act as barriers to upstream migration and that they warm the water stored behind them, 
which can negatively impact the fish by lowering the amount of oxygen in the water. He also 
noted that the canals would be a problem because they would sweep the fish into their 
channeled flow.7  
The Sacramento River salmon can serve as a lens for understanding the Central Valley 
Project. This story is primarily about the experts who worked on the Salmon Salvage Plan: the 
biologists who worked for the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the engineers who worked for the 
Bureau of Reclamation. Both engineers and biologists were willing to rearrange whole 
ecosystems to achieve their goals. While some of the biologists valued the salmon intrinsically, 
                                                          
5 Frank W. Fisher, “Past and Present Status of Central Valley Chinook Salmon,” Conservation 
Biology 8 No 3 (1994): 871. 
6Harry A. Hanson, Osgood R. Smith, and Paul R. Needham, An Investigation of Fish-Salvage 
Problems in Relation to Shasta Dam (Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Fisheries, 1940): 24. 
7 Robert de Roos, The Thirsty Land: The Story of the Central Valley Project (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1948): 175-187. 
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most of the debate about the value of the salmon focused on their commercial value. This 
resulted in the salmon being undervalued in other categories: ecological function, aesthetic 
utility, and ethical valuation. I will examine how ways of valuing the salmon impacted actions 
that affected the salmon.  
It is important to understand how Americans valued other types of nature than 
wilderness, and the Salvage Plan for salmon at the Shasta Dam is a fascinating part of that 
story. The story of Shasta’s salmon is one of static as well as changing ethical views of animals, 
and of how people assigned extrinsic and finally intrinsic values to California’s salmon. My 
thesis will discuss both these valuations of salmon. 
Relevant literature 
There are several bodies of literature that pertain to the story of the Shasta Salmon 
Salvage project. These are the history of conservation in the U.S., the history of water in the 
West, the histories and ecologies of West Coast salmon, California history, and the history of 
engineering. The literature addresses the political and economic aspects of water development 
in California and the long decline of northwestern fisheries, attempts to recreate the pre-
European Sacramento River ecosystem, and the challenges of building the dam.  
One of the foundational books in American environmental history is Wilderness and the 
American Mind by Roderick Nash. In this book, Nash explores the Hetch Hetchy-Echo Park story. 
He writes primarily about the idea of wilderness. Another book that is relevant to this study of 
people and fish in California is Wild Animals and American Environmental Ethics by Lisa 
Mighetto. The author traces changes in how Americans have viewed wild animals, arguing that 
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views began to change after evolutionary theory became more prominent. Mighetto discusses 
two schools of thought on why animals should be better treated. These schools of thought are 
humanitarianism which focuses on the individual animal, and biocentricism which focuses on 
the roles of species in ecosystems.  
The Rights of Nature by Roderick Nash discusses the history of environmental ethics. 
Nash argues that the community to which one owes an ethical duty has been expanded. In the 
early 20th century the idea of the ecosystem was first articulated, and soon after people began 
arguing that such communities had rights, for example Aldo Leopold in “The Land Ethic.” Nash 
focuses mostly on the second half of the twentieth century, but the book still provides some 
context for the ethical changes happening at the time of the events discussed in this thesis.  
There is extensive writing on the history of water allocation in the West and more 
specifically in California. This includes From the Family Farm to Agribusiness by Donald J. Pisani, 
Rivers of Empire by Donald Worster, Cadillac Desert by Marc Reisner, and The Great Thirst by 
Norris Hundley, Jr. These works tend to focus on the political and social aspects of dams and 
dam building. They help to explain the context in which these dams were built but don’t 
address in detail the impact of the dams on salmon or other wildlife. Cadillac Desert argues that 
water development in the West was economically as well as environmentally foolish, while 
Rivers of Empire argues that water development has helped to create a less democratic society. 
The general sense of these books is that the dams were politically motivated, benefited only a 
few, and had many negative environmental consequences. Pisani contends that early irrigation 
efforts were democratic in nature and enhanced life for small farmers and only later did the 
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larger projects such as Shasta Dam support large agribusiness. Hundley saw California’s water 
history as one of fragmented institutions in which voters still maintained ultimate control. All of 
these narratives focus on political and economic power. While required to consult with wildlife 
agencies, the Bureau of Reclamation held most of the political cards and had to be persuaded 
to participate in mitigation efforts during and after dam construction.  
Salmon have a literature of their own, though most environmental histories of salmon 
have focused on the Pacific Northwest rather than California. The most prominent 
environmental history of salmon is Joseph Taylor’s Making Salmon: an Environmental History of 
the Northwest Fisheries Crisis, in which he argues that the blame for salmon population decline 
is constantly being passed around while little is done. He also documents the changing attitude 
of northwesterners to the fish. Salmon without Rivers: A History of the Pacific Salmon Crisis by 
Jim Lichatowich offers a biologist’s perspective on salmon history. Lichatowich argues that the 
problem of salmon’s decline has a long history and that Euro-American ways of understanding 
nature as something to be exploited have greatly contributed to the salmon’s decline. A history 
of all California fisheries, not only the salmon fishery, The Fisherman’s Problem by Arthur F. 
McEvoy offers useful information about commercial fisheries. McEvoy argues that all efforts to 
conserve fisheries before the 1970s were based on the commercial value of the fish. These 
works are primarily about the continuous decline of fish populations since European settlement 
of the West Coast and our political failures to stop the decline. They provide context for my 
study which focuses on one specific population of Chinook salmon.   
Another critical source of information about salmon in California is the ecological 
literature. This literature is written by people whose primary training is in the sciences and is 
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intended for an audience of scientists, as opposed to historians writing about science. Especially 
helpful is Fish Bulletin 179 Contributions to the Biology of Central Valley Salmonids, published in 
2001, which, in addition to papers on the current ecology of salmon, contains two historical 
ecology papers, one of which deals explicitly with Shasta Dam. In “Shasta Salmon Salvage 
Efforts: Coleman National Fish Hatchery on Battle Creek, 1895–1992,” Michael Black gives a 
biological overview of the Shasta Salmon Project showing how the fish have declined since the 
dam was built. In “Historical and Present Distribution of Chinook Salmon in the Central Valley 
Drainage of California,“ Ronald M. Yoshiyama, Eric R. Gerstung, Frank W. Fisher, and Peter B. 
Moyle attempt to estimate historical populations of Chinook in California. The Bay Institutes’ 
report entitled From the Sierra to the Sea on the San-Francisco Bay-Delta watershed, an 
ecological unit that includes the Sacramento River, attempts to provide a description of the pre-
European watershed for purposes of ecological restoration and management. The literature 
that describes historic states of the ecosystem focuses on pre-settlement times which were 
taken as a baseline that ecological managers wished to recreate. I have not found any work 
which attempts to reconstruct the state of the ecosystem after European settlement.   
A variety of books on aspects of the history of California proved helpful in writing this 
thesis. These include Richard Walker’s The Conquest of Bread, which is an agricultural history of 
California, and The Fall and Rise of the Wetlands of California’s Great Central Valley by Philip 
Garone, an environmental history that focuses on waterfowl and wetlands. Also Kevin Starr’s 
series, Americans and the California Dream, has provided a great deal of helpful background 
information. Starr explains that in the early 1930s there was lot of labor unrest in California. 
Both urban and rural workers were involved in extensive strikes. In the fall of 1933, ten 
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thousand cotton pickers went on strike in the San Joaquin Valley, and in 1934 what started as a 
longshoremen’s strike became a three-day general strike in San Francisco. The 1930s was also a 
time when many long-planned infrastructure projects were built in California, for example the 
Bay Bridge, the Stockton Channel, and the Central Valley Project itself. 8   
A final source is Big Dams of the New Deal Era by David P. Billington and Donald C. 
Jackson. This book is an engineering history and offers many useful bits of information about 
how Shasta Dam was built and the engineering concerns that went into designing the dam.  
This thesis attempts to fill in some gaps. For one thing, the environmental history of the 
1930s and 1940s is still little explored. The impact of water policy on fish is also understudied. 
Additionally, most salmon history focuses on the area further north, paying little attention to 
the Sacramento River and major salmon runs in California. This thesis focuses on the 
interactions between water project engineers and biologists, and the formulation and 
development of extrinsic and intrinsic valuations for salmon and other fish in California.    
Why it matters 
The conservation ethics of this time period were dominated by progressive and 
utilitarian values–conservation was seen as the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people, a distinctly anthropocentric viewpoint. There were some hints of a more eco-centric 
viewpoint but for the most part only hints. Joel W. Hedgpeth, one of the research assistants on 
                                                          
8 Kevin Starr, Endangered Dreams: The Great Depression in California (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) 61-121, 309-340. 
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the project, wrote in 1941 about “the preservation of a species for its own sake.”9 Hedgpeth 
also tried to bring the plight of the salmon to public attention by writing about it in newspapers 
and magazines. Paul R. Needham, the leader of the salmon investigation team, was a member 
of the recently-founded (1935) Wilderness Society, dedicated to protecting wild spaces; he 
corresponded with Aldo Leopold, Professor of Game Management at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, a leader in the development of modern environmental ethics. 
Environmental values were changing. It seems that even among those working on the 
project, differing views on the value of non-human nature began to appear. These values may 
have been why these biologists, or at least some of them, put so much effort into saving the 
salmon. Generational shifts in values among the biologists emerged. Hedgpeth was much 
younger and more of an activist in nature than Needham. Differing ways of valuing nature may 
also explain many of the conflicts between biologists and engineers.  
  
                                                          
9 Joel W. Hedgpeth, “Livingston Stone and Fish Culture in California,” California Fish and Game 
27 no 3 (1941): 147. 
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CHAPTER 2. STARTING TO BUILD 
 
Before Shasta Dam 
The Sacramento River drains the northern half of California’s Central Valley, a rich 
agricultural region. The Valley is 450 miles long from north to south and varies from 40 to 70 
miles wide. The San Joaquin River flows north from the southern half of the valley. In roughly 
the middle of the valley, between the cities of Sacramento and Stockton, the Sacramento and 
San Joaquin Rivers meet and flow through a complex delta into the San Francisco Bay. Intensive 
cultivation of the valley began soon after the Gold Rush in the mid-19th century, and the idea of 
a comprehensive water plan, such as the Central Valley Project, dates back to the late 1800s.10   
The rainfall pattern in the Central Valley is not ideal for agriculture. The northern part of 
the valley receives an average of 30 inches a year while the southern part receives an average 
of only 5 inches per year. The rain falls primarily between December and April, leading to 
winter flooding and spring runoff and leaving little water during the height of the growing 
season. 11 The idea behind the Central Valley Project was to move water from the wet northern 
part of the valley to the drier southern part of the valley, and to provide irrigation water in the 
summer months by storing the winter rains.  
                                                          
10 Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst: Californians and Water A History, Revised Edition 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001): 243. 
11 US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project, accessed July 
11 2014, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Central Valley 
Project&pageType=ProjectPage. 
14 
 
In the mid-1800s gold miners in the Sierra Nevada developed a new technique called 
hydraulic mining. The technique relied on the fact that gold was much denser than the 
surrounding materials. Everything that was not gold was free to wash downstream, including 
tremendous amounts of dirt and gravel. Using vast amounts of water, the miners passed whole 
hillsides through their sluice boxes. The process brought large amounts of debris down the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers. Hydraulic mining choked salmon spawning grounds with 
debris and silt and sometimes even blocked access to them altogether making it difficult for the 
fish to reproduce.12  
Humans were also changing the salmons’ habitat with intensive agriculture in the 
Central Valley. The transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869 making the products of 
California farms available to a much broader market. Railroads were extended where none had 
been before, providing once sleepy towns with new opportunities to sell their crops. The first 
refrigerated rail car entered service in 1851. At first this technology was used primarily by meat 
packers in Chicago to ship fresh meat to the East Coast, but in 1889 the first shipment of cooled 
fruit was sold in New York. By the late 1880s, fruits and vegetables became the dominant crops 
in the Central Valley, replacing the earlier wheat boom. 
Human efforts to increase the salmon population also altered their habitat. The first 
salmon hatchery on the West Coast was established in 1872 in the McCloud River in Northern 
California, near the future site of Shasta Dam, by Livingston Stone, who worked for the federal 
government as a U.S. Deputy Fish Commissioner. His goal was to transplant Pacific salmon to 
                                                          
12 Kahrl, William L. The California Water Atlas (Sacramento: Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Research, 1979). 
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the East Coast to replace the declining Atlantic salmon there. The hatchery also shipped eggs to 
New Zealand.13 In addition to salmon, Stone also worked with trout and helped culture rainbow 
trout to stock the continental U.S. While Stone clearly valued salmon, he also thought that his 
actions could improve them. His ideas about nature and human interference with it were very 
different from those of most biologists working today. He saw no problem with transferring 
species around the globe. In an effort to improve salmon, he altered their lifecycle by raising 
them in a hatchery. In many ways Stone helped set the precedent for the scientists who would 
work to save the salmon whose spawning ground would be cut off by Shasta Dam.  
The beginning of the idea for the Central Valley Project dates back to March 1873 when 
Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to carry out a year-long survey of the Central 
Valley. This study began in April, and a year later the results were reported back to President 
Grant. Given the limited time and funding available, the survey was not particularly detailed, 
but it did recommend a large dam at the northern end of the Sacramento Valley similar to the 
modern day Shasta Dam.14 
Mining debris flowing downstream damaged farms in the Central Valley by increased 
flooding and debris which was deposited on the fields. The damage was so severe that the 
farmers went to court. In 1884, Justice Lorenzo Sawyer of the 9th Circuit Court in San Francisco, 
in the case of Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company, ruled in favor of the 
farmers, placing a permanent injunction on hydraulic mining and arguing that the damage was 
                                                          
13 Joel W. Hedgpeth, “Livingston Stone and the Fish Culture in California,” California Fish and 
Game 27 no 3 (1941)126-148. 
14 David P. Billington and Donald C. Jackson, Big Dams of the New Deal Era (University of 
Oklahoma: Norman, 2006), 283. 
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irredeemable, uncontrollable and impaired the community at large. This was a key turning 
point in California history; for the first time, miners lost out to farmers. It was also an important 
ruling in environmental law15. Even though hydraulic mining lasted only about thirty years, it 
would affect the hydrology of the state and the sedimentation of rivers for many more years by 
increasing the sediment washing down California’s rivers and streams. Some of this sediment 
clogged salmons’ gills. 
In 1902 Congress created the Reclamation Service, which in 1907 became the Bureau of 
Reclamation, whose job it was to bring irrigation to small farmers in the West.16 Their mandate 
was to build irrigation infrastructure and “make the desert bloom.” Thus the focus was on using 
natural resources to help people. Dams and canals created by the Bureau of Reclamation would 
further these goals. Settlers would help pay back the cost of the construction over time. 
Reclamation was limited to providing water to farms of 160 acres (the size of a federal 
homestead grant) or less. Congress did not intend that the Bureau would break up existing 
farms, but rather that the Bureau of Reclamation would help create new farms up to a certain 
size.  
Meanwhile, California agriculture was changing. Growers were moving away from the 
wheat which dominated in the late 1800s and towards fruits and vegetables. Chinese 
immigrants had introduced rice to the state during the Gold Rush, but it was not until the early 
20th century that it became a major crop. Farmers grew rice in flooded paddies, which 
                                                          
15 Kahrl, The California Water Atlas. 
16 Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No 57-161: (1902). 
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demanded large volumes of water.17 This practice increased the demand for agricultural water 
in the Sacramento basin and thus the need for a dam on the Sacramento River. 
Ideas about irrigation for the Central Valley continued to be developed. In 1919 Colonel 
Robert Bradford Marshal of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) proposed a plan to 
build several dams and canals in the Central Valley to send water south. While several plans to 
control flooding in the Sacramento Valley had been proposed, this was the first plan to control 
water in the whole of the Central Valley. In 1921 the California legislature considered Marshal’s 
plan. It passed in the State Senate but failed in the Assembly. Voters also rejected this plan 
three separate times when it was placed on the ballot in 1922, 1924 and 1926 (due to political 
maneuvering Marshal supported only the 1924 initiative).18 Few people took Marshal’s plan 
seriously.  
Since the time of the Gold Rush, the salmon had not been faring well. In 1929 the 
California Division of Fish and Game published Fish Bulletin 17, entitled Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) Fishery of California, written by G. H. Clark. This 
document helps us understand not only the health of the Central Valley salmon before the 
Central Valley Project, but also how people thought about the salmon at that time. Clark stated: 
“It is a foregone conclusion that the salmon fishery of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Rivers is 
depleted. The facts brought forth in this paper prove and strengthen the case. The causes of 
                                                          
17 W. Turrentine Jackson and Alan M. Peterson, The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta: The 
Evolution and Implementation of Water Policy (Davis, California: California Water Resources 
Center, 1977), 2. 
18 de Roos, The Thirsty Land, 20-21; Hundley, The Great Thirst,242-244. 
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this depletion and their corrections are now the important things.”19 It is clear that even before 
the Central Valley Project began construction, the salmon were in trouble, and some people 
were concerned about it. In detailing the condition of various rivers in the watershed, the Fish 
Bulletin stated:  
There are thirty-five dams in the Sacramento system that directly or indirectly affect the salmon 
migration. Of these, sixteen have working fish ladders, and at eleven of these dams the ditches 
have adequate screens; four of the ladders in the system are under construction or repair. It has 
also been determined that the available spawning grounds do not support as large a population 
of spawning fish each year as they are capable of doing.20 
This statement makes it clear that by 1929 the rivers had been modified heavily by dams 
and ditches; presumably the primary purpose of these modifications was to irrigate agricultural 
lands. Despite the extreme habitat degradation, Clark claims that the “greatest single cause”21 
of population decline in California’s salmon is “extensive overfishing during the last fifteen or 
twenty years.”22 It is not clear why Clark focused on overfishing, though he does note the 
declining catch. Clark worked for the Bureau of Marine Fisheries, so he may have felt that 
overfishing was something he could do more about, or he may have felt political pressure to 
blame the group that was least able to fight back.  
Ultimately, Clark was not optimistic about the future of salmon in the Central Valley. He 
wrote, “The fishery seems to be at a point where it will require a great deal of concentrated 
                                                          
19 G. H. Clark, Sacramento-San Joaquin Salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) Fishery of 
California, California Division of Fish and Game, Fish Bulletin No. 17 (1929), 24. 
20 Ibid., 29. 
21 Ibid., 23. 
22 Ibid., 23. 
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effort on the part of the people of the state to protect it and if possible to build it up.” 23 Yet he 
did not say if he thought such an effort was likely. The Central Valley Project would not help 
matters as it would alter the watershed in ways that would damage the salmon population. 
Another problem faced by salmon at the time was pollution. Clark noted, “Pollution of 
the river from the drainage of rice fields has been known to kill adult salmon.”24 There were 
other sources of contamination as well. A 1940 report, written as part of the Salmon Salvage 
Project, noted that five streams in the Shasta area were “appreciably contaminated by mine 
tunnel drainage.”25 Paul A. Shaw, working for the U.S Bureau of Fisheries (USBF), measured 
copper, zinc and pH levels in these streams and in the Sacramento River. He found that, “The 
copper content of the Sacramento River rose above the lethal limit for trout on several 
sampling days and calculations indicate near lethal limits for most of the investigation 
period.”26 Thus the watershed was polluted from several sources, and often this pollution 
reached lethal levels for salmon. It is likely that these chemicals had negative effects on the 
Chinook even at well below lethal concentrations.  
The ecology of California’s salmon had also been altered by fish cultivation. In 1929 
there were three salmon hatcheries on the upper Sacramento River: Baird Station, Battle Creek, 
and Mill Creek. Baird Station, the oldest of these, had been operating almost continuously since 
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1872. Battle Creek had operated since 1895, and Mill Creek since 1910. These hatcheries 
gathered eggs from spawning salmon and raised them to young fry, the river dwelling stage of 
the young salmon’s life cycle. The fry were then released—mostly to the rivers they came from, 
but some were transplanted to other rivers, although after 1888 very few fish left California.27 
Clark stated:  
The fish culture work, considering its magnitude, should show better results. However, other 
contributing causes of depletion such as overfishing, dams, overflow basins, and fishes 
predatory on the young and eggs may have offset any good that artificial propagation has done. 
There is no evidence on either side conclusive enough to warrant making a definite statement as 
to the success or failure of artificial propagation.28 
Thus it was unclear at the time what effect these hatcheries were having on salmon 
ecology. However, it was certainly clear that overfishing and habitat loss were major dangers to 
the salmon.  
In his 1929 report, Clark wrote:  
Salmon conservation depends basically on only one factor, that is, that sufficient adult salmon 
are allowed to spawn, so that the population can be perpetuated at a reasonably high level. 
Destruction of the spawning reserve by any means, whether it be by overfishing, pollution, 
impassable dams or any other factor, can result in but one condition: the eventual 
disappearance of salmon from our waters.29 
Clark’s report shows that the Chinook already faced many problems in the years before Shasta 
Dam was constructed, as construction on Shasta did not begin until 1938. 
However, the forces favoring a vast rearrangement of the Central Valley’s water had not 
disappeared, despite the lack of interest in Marshal’s plan. In March of 1931, State Engineer 
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Edward Hyatt proposed a “state water plan” similar to what eventually became the Central 
Valley Project. By this time the Great Depression was well underway and large civic projects 
were being proposed across the country. Hyatt’s plan included the Shasta Dam (then called 
Kennett), the Friant Dam, and 120 miles of canals with pumps. This was somewhat scaled back 
from Marshal’s USGS plan for multiple dams and canals and based on better data which had 
been collected in the 1920s. The engineering requirements were also better detailed and more 
realistic, and the plan would be cheaper to implement.30 This time the project received much 
more political support and became the basis of the Central Valley Project Act. 
There were several factors that lead to the legislature finally approving such a project. 
These included: much improved engineering data; the drought which started in 1929; the 
state’s need for more electric power; and the belief that the project would help stop salt water 
intrusions. Finally, it was important that the dam would help create jobs.31 
The New Deal and non-human nature 
To understand the Central Valley Project it helps to have an understanding of the wider 
context of the New Deal and how the government was approaching nature at the time. The 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) is emblematic of how the Federal government saw nature in 
the 1930s. The CCC was part of Roosevelt’s job creation program. Young men were hired to live 
in camps on federal land and work to improve and conserve these lands. These young men 
changed the outdoor landscape of many parks. They created trails, visitors’ centers and roads, 
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planted trees, and worked to reduce erosion. These projects reflected the idea that outdoor 
recreation was valuable and should be accessible. On the other hand, changing the landscape in 
this way did not please advocates of wilderness. They thought that the reserves should not be 
modified by human labor.32 In California’s Central Valley Project, the former view in favor of 
accessible nature was much more in evidence than the latter view in favor of isolated 
wilderness. For example, the project created Lake Shasta that was used for recreation, but as 
humans had created the lake, advocates felt it could not be considered wilderness.  
Roosevelt established the CCC in 1933, the same year he approved funding for the 
Central Valley Project. The president’s conservation ethic focused on human uses of nature. 
Before becoming president, Roosevelt had practiced scientific forestry on his family estate in 
New York, managing the estate for efficient timber production. He also advocated that rural 
land be put to the use from which “greatest economic return can be derived.” As governor of 
New York, he helped create similar programs on smaller scales in the state. In September 1931, 
Roosevelt created the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA), which provided jobs 
for the unemployed in New York State including many jobs in re-forestation33.  
The CCC was an offshoot of a strand of American thought that identified virtue with 
spending time in nature and rural life. This philosophy dates back at least as far as Thomas 
Jefferson, who claimed that farmers made engaged and virtuous citizens. The CCC embodied 
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the New Deal’s approach to nature, combining Pinchot-style conservation and a concern for 
individual interactions with nature.   
The Central Valley Project was built during an era of immense construction projects. For 
example, in California the Hetch Hetchy project was completed in 1934, and the San Francisco 
Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate Bridge were both built in the 1930’s. Other big projects built at 
this time were Hoover Dam, Bonneville Dam and many other dams on the Columbia as well as 
the system of dams of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Many of these projects had been 
planned long before the New Deal, but the work programs provided the funding that made 
them possible. 34  Among engineers and planners, there was a persistent willingness to 
rearrange nature and a feeling of optimism about humans’ ability to control natural forces. 
Thus politicians and engineers were willing to rearrange things on a grand scale. However, they 
felt little concern for wildlife, often believing that wildlife, too, could be controlled.  
Legislation and funding 
In July 1933, the California legislature passed a bill authorizing the Central Valley Project. 
The bill passed with a strong majority in the Assembly and a narrow majority in the Senate. 
Governor James Rolph, Jr. signed into law the Central Valley Project Act, which authorized 
$170,000,000 in bonds to build the project. 35 
The California Legislature was not thinking of salmon when they authorized the Central 
Valley Project. There were many social and economic forces at work in the Central Valley. The 
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valley was and remains a rich agricultural area but also a place of great economic inequality 
between landowners and migrant workers.36 Other economic interests played the primary role 
in bringing the project to fruition. For example, John B. McColl, a California State Senator from 
Redding, the district where Shasta Dam was eventually built, played a major role in getting the 
state act passed. His constituents thought the dam would help provide them with good jobs.37 
The district was suffering economically due to the many copper mines in the region being 
abandoned.38 Labor and farm interests in the Central Valley also strongly supported the bill 
because it would mean jobs building the dam for union workers and irrigation for farmers.39  
Legislators also saw the project as providing irrigation, hydro-electric power, and flood 
control. The three dams and five canals would transform California’s water system by shipping 
water from the northern part of the Central Valley to the southern part where grapes, cotton, 
almonds, tomatoes, walnuts, apples, and other water-hungry fruits and vegetables were 
grown.40 The valley receives relatively little rain, and most of that occurs in the wet winter 
months; snowmelt can also cause frequent spring flooding. Thus the Central Valley Project 
would store the winter rains and the spring snow melt providing water for irrigation during the 
dry summer months. Shasta Dam, the northern most piece of the project, would sit near the 
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headwaters of the Sacramento River. In addition to storing water for irrigation, the dams would 
be used to generate hydro-eclectic power. 
The legislature, knowing that the state couldn’t afford to fund the project fully, opted to 
include a public power provision in the Central Valley Project Act. Federal policy at that time 
was much more likely to fund projects with public power provisions. The provision provided for 
all power generated by the project to be sold by the government rather than by private 
companies. This angered officials at Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), the major utility in Northern 
California, who didn’t want to compete with cheap public power.   
PG&E responded by launching a referendum campaign. The company gathered enough 
signatures to force the law authorizing the project to face a repeal election. A yes vote would 
mean that the law as it was would go forward, while a no vote meant that the law would be 
repealed. The Central Valley Project was unpopular in Southern California because that part of 
the state did not benefit from the Central Valley Project as proposed at the time. Southern 
California orange growers also feared that the project would create competition for them by 
increasing the number of farmers. PG&E hoped the law would be repealed. Governor James 
Rolph strongly supported the Act, saying, “If any special interests try to block this measure or 
delay it in any way, I am prepared to fight them to the last ditch of my executive authority.”41 
Despite PG&E’s campaigning, in December 1933 when the measure went before the voters, the 
referendum passed, though only by a slim margin with low voter turnout. This meant that the 
                                                          
41 Hundley, The Great Thirst, 255-257. 
26 
 
project would be built. The vote was split between northern California, which favored retaining 
the law, and southern which opposed the referendum.42 
To build the Central Valley Project, the state would need money. The law that 
authorized the project called for it to be funded by bonds that would later be paid back through 
the sale of power and water from the project. While the state was authorized to issue bonds for 
the project, it could not afford to do so. After the referendum passed, California legislators 
were quick to ask the federal government for help. The state applied for a grant from the 
Emergency Administration for Public Works, a forerunner of the Works Progress 
Administration. At the time California was a solidly Republican state and out-going president 
Hoover, an engineer from California, was very sympathetic to the project. At first, Hoover’s 
reelection defeat seemed likely to prevent the project from ever receiving federal funding. 
However, it soon became clear that Roosevelt’s New Deal might be a source of funding, and an 
appeal was made to Congress to provide the funds since the state could not sell the bonds 
authorized for the project. When the money was not quickly forthcoming, the state sent 
Edward Hyatt, the State Engineer, to testify before the House Committee on Flood Control in 
early 1935. During his testimony, Hyatt repeatedly said that he didn’t care if the project 
remained under state control or was under federal control–the main thing was to get the 
Central Valley Project done.43 Hyatt stated that the state was willing to work with either the 
Bureau of Reclamation or the Army Corps of Engineers so long as the project got built.  
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In the end, the federal money came through different channels than originally expected. 
The 1935 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the federal government to contribute $12,000,000 
toward the Central Valley Project. However, this money was never appropriated. Then in 
December 1935 Roosevelt authorized $20,000,000 (later reduced to $4,200,000) from the 
Emergency Relief Appropriation. The President put the Bureau of Reclamation in charge of the 
project, reducing California’s control. Funding for the project was part of the New Deal and was 
motivated by a desire to create jobs. The stated purpose of the project was to supply water for 
irrigation to the southern part of the Central Valley.44 While some argue that irrigation was a 
driving factor for agriculture in California, Walker argues that agriculture was driving the need 
for more irrigation.45 
Central Valley Project overview 
Precipitation in California is seasonal; the state has a Mediterranean climate, with rainy 
winters and dry summers. In addition the state is much wetter in the north than it is the south. 
Both of these are problems for the irrigated agriculture in the Central Valley .The Central Valley 
Project aimed to store winter rainfall and spring snowmelt for summer use, and also to move 
water from the north of the state to the south. 
To understand what the project does, it is helpful to start at Friant Dam on the 
headwaters of the San Joaquin River. This dam impounds the water coming out of the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains into the river, which is then sent south in the Friant-Kern Canal which ends 
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near Bakersfield. The water is used primarily for irrigation. The water taken at Friant is enough 
to seriously deplete and in many years even de-water the San Joaquin. To replace the water in 
the river, water is pumped through the Delta, down the Delta-Mendota Canal to the Mendota 
Pool. This water is used to refill the San Joaquin so that rights holders along the river can 
continue to withdraw water. 
The water pumped from the Delta to refill the river comes from further north: Shasta 
Dam which sits near the head waters of the Sacramento River. Shasta is the key source of water 
in the system.  
Early considerations 
Due to the time needed to make plans and hire contractors, it was not until 1937 that 
construction of the Central Valley Project began with the Contra Costa Canal. This canal would 
bring fresh water through the Delta to the cities in Contra Costa County, such as Pittsburgh and 
Antioch. Because so little water was reaching the sea, the cities on the edge of the Delta were 
having trouble getting fresh water. Brackish water from the Bay was intruding far up into the 
Delta where the cities were obtaining their water.   
The officials at the Bureau of Reclamation divided the Central Valley Project into three 
regional divisions: Kennet, Delta and Friant. Each of these was responsible for a different part of 
the project. The Delta division worked on the various canals through the Delta, the Friant 
division worked on the Friant Dam and related canals in the Southern part of the San Joaquin 
Valley, and the Kennet division was responsible for Shasta and Keswick Dams.  
29 
 
The earliest record that anyone contacted the Bureau of Reclamation about the salmon 
that would be impacted by Shasta Dam was on February 14, 1936, when District Counsel 
Honnold at the Sacramento office of the Bureau of Reclamation wrote to Construction Engineer 
Walker Young. Young had joined Reclamation in 1911, played an important role in building the 
Hoover Dam, and worked as the supervising engineer for Shasta Dam. He later became Chief 
Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation.   
Honnold began by saying, “The upper reaches of the Sacramento River, particularly 
McCloud River, are the spawning grounds of much of the Salmon and Steel heads of the state 
and interference with the fish industry and sport is sure to provoke much publicity and perhaps 
criticism.”46 Existing state law required the builders of dams to construct either fish ladders or 
hatcheries when they built dams that affected any species of native fish. This law dated from 
the 1850s but was not enforced until the 1970s. This was in part because the law was in conflict 
with other parts of California water law which demanded water be put to “beneficial use.” 
Attempts in the 1920s by the California Department of Fish and Game to enforce the law were 
overruled by the state Water Board.47 There was also a federal law, the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act of 1934, that directed the USBF, then in the Department of Commerce, to 
study the effects of federal water projects on fish. District Counsel Honnold wrote, “Since it will 
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require months for investigations, preparation of plan and designs by the state and federal 
agencies, a considerable period for construction and the cost will be of large dimension, I 
believe early consideration of this matter is desirable.”48 
Young forwarded Honnold’s letter to the Chief Engineer, Raymond F. Walter, with a 
brief note, which remarked that there was an existing hatchery.49 On March 6, 1936, Walter 
replied to Young and stated that the matter would be “carefully studied” and instructing Young 
to request the California Fish and Game Commission [sic] to “… make tentative 
recommendations on such fish structures or facilities as may be deemed necessary at the 
project mentioned above and also at the Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River.”50  
On May 7, 1936, Young received a letter from Herbert C. Davis, Executive Officer of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Fish and Game, which was probably in response 
to this request. Davis said that the project was required by state law to include fish ladders or 
hatcheries and that $250,000 should be estimated for this cost. 51 After this the matter seems 
to have been dropped, despite earlier statements indicating that some type of study was 
planned. It is unclear whether the money was budgeted; certainly it is not referred to in later 
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budgets. Young did not investigate the problem any further, feeling this type of thing was 
beyond the scope of Reclamation’s work. It seems that Reclamation simply ignored California 
and Federal Law. In fact the law seems to have largely been unenforced at that time, and most 
Californians also paid it little heed. 52 
On July 8, 1936, the Bureau of Reclamation announced the winning bid for “core drilling 
and excavation for investigation”53 at the Kennet Dam site. This preliminary investigation 
needed to take place before the design of the dam could be completed. 
Very little relevant to the salmon happened between Young’s receipt of Davis’s letter 
and 1938. On December 8, 1936, Walter sent plans for Friant Dam to Young to be forwarded to 
the Division of Fish and Game.54 And on April 7, 1937, Fred J. Foster, Regional Director of Fish 
Culture, USBF, Seattle Washington, wrote to Roy M. Snell, the regional engineer in 
Reclamation’s Redding office. Foster explained that USBF was considering decommissioning the 
hatchery at Baird on the upper Sacramento River and wanted to know if Reclamation would be 
interested in purchasing the hatchery. Foster stated that his agency was quite short of funds so 
that they couldn’t afford to just give Reclamation the buildings.55 This shows that the USBF was 
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quite worried about money and likely constantly underfunded. No action seems to have 
resulted from either of those letters. 
Promoting the dam 
In the time before construction began on Shasta Dam, the Bureau of Reclamation did 
much to promote the dam to the general public. For example, on March 9, 1937, Supervising 
Engineer Young went to Bakersfield, the largest community in the San Joaquin Valley, to give a 
speech. In his speech Young said, “Briefly stated, the Central Valley Project embodies a plan for 
the conservation, regulation, distribution, and utilization of the water resources of the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers to provide urgently needed water supplies for existing 
agricultural, industrial, and municipal developments in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys 
and upper San Francisco Bay region, which contain 3,000,000 acres of 900,000 persons. “56 
Young especially pointed out the agricultural benefits; overall his speech focused on how the 
dam would benefit humans and said very little about non-human nature. 
Another part of Reclamation’s public relations campaign was naming the dam. On 
Sunday September 12, 1937, it was announced that the dam would be named Shasta, in honor 
of nearby Mt Shasta. Before this the dam was unofficially know as Kennet. In a press release, 
John C. Page, the Commissioner of Reclamation, explained the significance of the new name, 
“Mt Shasta, a double-peaked extinct volcano towering 14, 161 feet above sea level is one of the 
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Nation’s highest and one of the world’s most beautiful mountains.“57 As a volcano, Mt. Shasta 
has a distinct cone shape and is significantly taller than the surrounding mountains. In the same 
press release, Page stated that, “By providing better distribution of water in the semi-arid 
interior valleys of California, the project will preserve or restore these rich areas already highly 
developed–areas representing a producing agricultural investment of two billion dollars now 
facing decline or collapse because of an inadequate water supply.” 58 At this point, Page 
thought of the project as helping existing farms rather than creating new ones. The quote also 
demonstrates his continued focus on irrigation. 
In December 1937 major flooding in the Central Valley and Northern California 
strengthened the resolve of Reclamation. They believed that if the Central Valley Project was in 
place, it would prevent floods like that from occurring. California had real problems and 
Reclamation felt they had a solution.59 
Young received a warm welcome from California growers who believed the project 
would benefit them. For example on January 12, 1938, he was the guest of honor at a “valley 
wide meeting in Tulare.”60 Young was also the subject of many newspaper profiles and was 
invited to give a number of speeches.  
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Bell and Page 
The project got its real start on January 13, 1938, when Frank T. Bell, the Commissioner 
of the USBF wrote to John C. Page, a Nebraska-educated civil engineer who rose through the 
ranks to become Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation in 1936, suggesting “the 
Reclamation Service should provide funds for the Bureau of Fisheries that a study of the 
situation can be made with regard to the maintenance of the salmon run in the Sacramento 
River.” Bell went on to explain that the salmon fishery is “very valuable” and to request $25,000 
from Reclamation.61 This was a rather daring move on Bell’s part. However, this letter led to 
Reclamation’s first serious consideration of the needs of salmon. 
After receiving Bell’s letter, Page wrote to Chief Engineer Walter and Supervising 
Engineer Young to ask their opinions on the matter. Walter was agreeable with the expense, 
but Young wrote: “This office is of the opinion it would be proper to render financial assistance 
to the USBF in making this investigation, but the amount requested, $25,000, seems extremely 
high especially if the investigation is to be a joint one with other agencies who will bear their 
own expense.” 62 Young seemed very reluctant to work with the fish; he clearly didn’t see 
concern for the environment as part of an engineer’s role.  
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On February 28, 1938, Page replied to Bell agreeing that investigation should be made 
and saying the bureau would provide some funds.63 It is not clear why Page agreed. There were 
no environmental impact reports required; Page was legally bound by the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act and California law to mitigate the dam’s effect on fish, but he had been 
ignoring these requirements until now. However, he must have had some sympathy for the 
salmon—unlike many others in his organization.  
Starting to write the Hanson, Needham and Smith report 
Paul R. Needham, the USBF biologist at Stanford, was to take charge of the project. He 
was the team leader for the biological investigation of the salmon problem that began in 1938. 
While he did not lead the team in the field, he was the person who corresponded with Bureau 
officials. He served as an Aquatic Biologist with the USBF from 1931 to 1940, stationed at 
Stanford University, and then he worked with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service from 1940 to 
1944. In 1944 Dr. Needham became Director of Fisheries with the Oregon State Game 
Commission. He later came back to California to assume a zoology professorship at the 
University of California - Berkeley. His father was an entomology professor at Cornell and a 
well-known conservationist.  
Osgood R. Smith from the California Division of Fish and Game was also brought into the 
project. Later a third biologist, H. A. Hanson, was recruited and was in charge of most of the 
work in the field. These three scientists would author the major report on the science of the 
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fish and what should be done to save them. While the biologists were starting their 
investigations, construction of Shasta had already begun. 
On April 1, 1938, a conference was held at the USBF offices at Stanford. In addition to 
Needham, and Smith, Herbert C Davis, A.C. Taft, N. B. Scofield, and G. H. Clark, all employed by 
the California Department of Fish and Game, were present. These were all biologists, not 
engineers, which makes sense for the beginning of the project. Many people important in 
California fisheries science were present. Scofield and Clark worked for the State Fish and Game 
Agency, and both had done extensive work on salmon. The scientists worked to put together a 
preliminary plan for the investigation. The plan as outlined dealt with both migratory and non-
migratory fish that would be affected by Shasta Dam and had an estimated initial cost of 
$17,100. The planned investigation would count salmon at Redding Dam, survey the spawning 
grounds above and below the dam, and research what diversion screens and other engineering 
features would be needed to protect the salmon. Needham wrote up the plan as a 
memorandum and sent it to Bell, who on May 10, 1938, sent it on to Page. 64  
In the memo, Needham wrote that migratory fish were of more importance than non-
migratory fish, because of their commercial value and because actions would need to be taken 
sooner to protect these fish. The memo showed that they knew very little about the problem at 
this point since some very basic information still needed to be researched, such as the “extent 
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of spawning area that will be cut off by the dam.”65 They also needed to know how many fish 
migrated up the Sacramento each year.  
In the late 1930’s biologists had a rudimentary understanding of salmon ecology. It was 
becoming a matter of settled scientific consensus that salmon migrated far out to sea, but 
returned to the stream where they hatched to spawn, and that each seasonal run was a 
breeding population. This meant, for example, that allowing more fall run salmon to spawn 
would not create more spring run fish because the two populations were separate and did not 
interbreed.66 Needham and his fellow biologists knew that the Sacramento River runs were not 
interchangeable with fish from other rivers or between runs. 
On April 30, 1938, Ralph Lowry, who had worked on Hoover Dam, was appointed as the 
Construction Engineer at Shasta.67 While the dam was built by a third party contractor, not the 
Bureau of Reclamation directly, the Reclamation Construction Engineer still played an 
important role. Lowry served as the Bureau of Reclamation’s engineer who worked most closely 
with the builders since the Construction Engineer was in charge of overseeing the fabrication of 
the dam.  
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation continued its public outreach. On May 10, 1938, 
a radio address sponsored by the Bureau entitled “California’s Most Precious Resource” was 
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broadcast by radio stations across the state.  This broadcast praised the Central Valley Project 
and how it would change California’s relationship with water, providing flood control while 
“conserving” the winter rains for human use. However, the broadcast did not once mention 
salmon.68  
On May, 12 1938, Bell telegraphed Needham to say Page had agreed to fund the salmon 
salvage project. Needham then wrote to Young and requested a meeting soon.69 This would be 
the first in-person meeting of a biologist from the USBF with an engineer from Reclamation. 
This is the first reference to Page’s officially funding the project. Needham seems to have been 
on top of things and ready to get started right away, especially since he had already done some 
work before this, outlining the project and hosting a meeting. 
However, the Chief Engineer of Reclamation, Raymond F. Walter, was not entirely 
pleased with the project. He wrote to Young “… we had understood that the commercial fish 
problem would not be of much importance at Shasta Dam, and it is hoped the proposed 
investigation will so demonstrate, which is largely the reason for our cooperation in the 
investigation.”70 Walter clearly hoped that the investigation would find that salmon were not 
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worth bothering about. He claims to have understood this already, even though he and Young 
had not investigated or researched the fish. 
The first conference between the biologists and the engineers was held on May 18, 
1938, at Young’s Sacramento office. Needham, Smith, G.H. Park, Young and “others of this 
office” were present (Hanson had not yet been brought into the project.) They discussed how 
little data they had at this point; only one count of the yearly salmon run had been performed. 
It was generally agreed that Needham and his colleagues would do all the work and 
Reclamation would fund the project. In his report to Walter, Young doesn’t seem upset or 
worried about the salmon project, though his later communications became more hostile to 
the fish.71  
A letter dated June 1, 1938, from J. W. B. Rice protested continuing damage by human 
activity affecting the salmon. This is the first record of public concern from outside of the 
project. Rice said that the salmon were disappearing not because of the “Japs” but because of 
the “construction of dams by power companies.”72 He rejected one fairly dominant narrative 
but still placed the fault as belonging to a single actor. It is interesting how seriously this letter 
seemed to be taken. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes forwarded the letter to Page who 
wrote a short reply. The reply is not very specific and makes no concrete promises, but it is still 
more than a form letter. Page struck an earnest tone, writing, “I appreciate the interest you 
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have shown in making available the results of your observations. You will be pleased to know 
that this Bureau is cooperating with the Bureau of Fisheries and the State of California in an 
investigation of the fish problems in the Sacramento River, particularly concerning the effect of 
the construction of Shasta Dam.”73 
The construction of the dam continued. Bidding on the dam construction contract was 
held June 1, 1938, in Sacramento. Only two major bids were received. The two companies 
bidding were Pacific Constructors Incorporated (PCI) and Shasta Construction Company, a 
reorganization of the six companies which had built the Hoover Dam.74 PCI underbid the Shasta 
Construction Company slightly and won the contract. However, this did not have much impact 
on the salmon. The major actors in the story remained biologists and agency officials. PCI did 
not get involved in the conversation between Reclamation and USBF about the fish.  
The USBF’s biologists also communicated to the general public about their work. The 
October 1938 issue of Associated Sportsman contained an article by Smith, one of the 
investigators, called “Fact Finding Survey in the Sacramento Drainage Basin.” Sport fishers were 
already interested in the project at this point and would become more involved later. The 
article provided an overview of the project. Smith also noted that “… we know that the run has 
decreased.” He went on to say, “Obviously the runs must be salvaged in some safe manner 
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which will be in accord with the normal migratory instincts of the fish concerned.”75 This 
showed great optimism that salvage could be done, and it is also worth noting that Smith 
thought such a course of action was obvious. This article gives us a clue as to how Smith 
thought about the value of salmon–to him they were obviously, and without need for debate, 
worth saving. That suggests that Smith valued salmon for their own sake though he did not 
come out and say so directly. 
On October 22, 1938, a ceremony was held at Redding celebrating the “start of heavy 
construction at Shasta Dam.”76 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes gave a speech in which he 
said Shasta Dam was “another milestone in this nation’s progress on the road to practical 
conservation.”77 Ickes is using the word “conservation” here in a progressive sense. This 
concept of conservation focuses on management of water not protection of the environment. 
Most people today think conserving water means using less–shorter showers, fewer water 
greedy lawns, etc. But for many people involved with the Central Valley Project, conservation 
was about making more water available, so it was not “wasted” by flowing out to sea. In this 
concept of conservation any water not put to human use is lost. Dams, which allowed water to 
be stored, were seen as conserving water. 
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On November 14, 1938, S. Ross Hatton of the California Division of Fish and Game 
produced a two page document called “Preliminary outline of proposed investigation of fishes 
in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System.” This report was similar to Needham’s memo but 
a bit more detailed. It listed several areas of investigation such as spawning, which included 
then present spawning areas, the characteristics of good spawning areas, and spawning 
migration; migration, which included counting migrants, and migration timing, food, which 
included available food, sampling plantings and the river bottom; and predation and 
abundance, which included caught records and sampling methods. Hatton also included a 
rough cost estimate of $16,082 for the first year of the investigation.78  
The team soon began work investigating the salmon’s biology. Joel W. Hedgpeth was a 
student at the University of California-Berkeley at the time and the “junior member of the field 
crew” working on the investigation of the salmon. In 1941 he would write a paper about 
Livingston Stone in which he talked about saving species for their own sake. He later became an 
environmental activist and wrote several newspaper articles opposing the construction of the 
Central Valley Project for environmental reasons. In the 1960s he worked to oppose the 
construction of a nuclear power plant on Bodega Head on the California coast. While his role in 
the Salmon Salvage Project was relatively minor, he is important because he exemplifies a 
newer way of thinking about and advocating for salmon, valuing them for their own sake rather 
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than merely as food or sport. Hedgpeth was part of the slow movement to increase 
environmental awareness.  
Hedgpeth described the working conditions thusly: “During the long summer we were 
based at Baird on the McCloud River; in the winter some of us continued at Stanford University 
in a basement office in the museum, directly underneath Governor Stanford’s locomotive No. 1. 
We often looked thoughtfully at the beams overhead, hoping that the next earthquake would 
not occur during working hours.”79 This gives a feel for what the work was like. Clearly those 
working on the salmon project did not have prime office space.  
1939 
On February 8, 1939, a conference was held at State Engineer Hyatt’s office. Smith, 
Hanson, Clark, Hatton, Hyatt, Calland, the Assistant Supervising Engineer on the Central Valley 
Project, and Young were all present (this was the first meeting between biologists and 
Engineers where Hanson was in attendance). Young wrote, “The State and the Bureau of 
Fisheries appear to be giving joint study to the possible effect on fish, not only of the 
construction of the project as now authorized but on the ultimate state if and when it is carried 
out.” He went on to say that the biologists asked the engineers many questions about the 
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operation of the dams, but that most of the answers were unknown, and that he therefore felt 
that it was not a very productive meeting.80 
On February 27, 1939, Hanson, one of the biologists working on the project, sent a 
manuscript of “Sacramento River Salmon Nest Redds” to Lowry to be approved for publication. 
The paper described in detail how female salmon built redds, the gravel nests where they lay 
their eggs. The biologists also dug up the redds to study the eggs and tried to keep them for 
observation until they hatched. However, due to flooding the eggs were lost. They hoped to 
repeat the experiment with better results the following year.81 Despite the results, this paper 
helps us understand the types of investigations that were on going and how little biologists still 
knew about the early stages of the salmon lifecycle. Their lack of knowledge meant that 
biologists didn’t always understand the long term impact of Shasta Dam and were not in 
positions of power when advocating for the fish.  
By early 1939, the salmon project was already beginning to exceed the original 
estimated budget. On February 24, 1939, Jackson wrote to Page, “For your information we 
should also tell you that the magnitude of the salmon salvage problem in connection with 
Shasta Dam is as large as or larger than that brought about by the construction of the Grand 
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Coulee Dam.”82 Jackson was probably trying to secure more project funding by making this 
comparison, but he was also emphasizing the importance of the project. It really was a 
substantial project that affected a very large salmon run. Jackson also included Needham’s 
financial statement and a tentative plan for further work. 
In a letter on March 11, 1939, to Chief Engineer Walter, Commissioner of Reclamation 
Page wrote, “I feel that we will have to go along with the Bureau of Fisheries in this work…”83 It 
is still unclear why Page decided to support the salmon project. Here he seems reluctant to 
support the project but thinks he is obligated; however, it is not clear whether it is a legal or 
moral obligation. Page also asked Walter and Young for comments on the matter. They both 
sent telegrams. Walter’s was brief and stated that he had “no objection” to giving the USBF 
funding.84 Young’s reply was longer–he objected to financing “general aspects of problems of 
another department,” but given the USBF’s lack of funds, saw “no alternative.” 85 
Yet later that month, on March 20, 1939, Walter wrote a much more hostile letter to 
the Salmon Salvage Program. “I believe, however, that a considerable part of this cost is 
involved in securing data on the Sacramento Salmon Industry problem in general, as it is 
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known, that it becomes practically dormant during recent years, and I doubt if the Shasta Dam 
will have much influence on it as it now exists. I had hopes that the report would conclusively 
so show.”86 He felt that the program was trying to help a dying industry and that doing so was 
well beyond the scope of Reclamation. This shows a fairly extrinsic view of the salmon, one 
based on the fish’s value to humans and not the salmon’s inherent worth. Walter was implying 
that they are important only as a commercial catch and that since the industry was then not 
very profitable, the salmon were no longer worth bothering about.  
On April 8, 1939, Hanson, the field leader of the biological investigation, sent a letter to 
Construction Engineer Lowry asking for permission to proceed with a conference abstract.87 In 
the abstract Hanson discusses the data they have so far–mostly the 1938 count at Redding Dam 
and the 1938 commercial catch. He goes on to say, “The choice of salvage lies between bringing 
new waters to the fish or the fish to new waters.”88 Both of these are major interventions–and 
neither is “natural.” Hanson thinks that some combination of these two strategies will be most 
likely to succeed. He seemed reasonably optimistic about salvaging the salmon. 
On April 26, 1939, another conference was held, this time in San Francisco. Foster of the 
USBF, Davis, Taft, Hatton, and Leo Shapovalov from the California Division of Fish and Game, as 
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well as Needham, Smith and Hanson, the leaders of the investigation, were all there. Based on 
this meeting, Needham sent Young a work program giving him a rough outline of the work to 
be done.89  
From June 6 to June 8, 1939, Needham and Smith were in the field near Redding where 
they conferred with Lindgren, an engineer working for the USBF, and Hanson and other 
engineers working for the Bureau of Reclamation. The fieldwork was making progress. The 
spring run was being counted, tributaries below the dam had been surveyed (and found 
wanting) and holding and ripening experiments on how to best raise salmon eggs were being 
conducted. Needham wrote to Jackson, Acting Commissioner of USBF, “The only salvage 
scheme developed to date, other than relying entirely on artificial propagation for all time, 
consists, briefly of diverting water into a stream which now goes dry in summer and 
transferring the running to it.” This was Hanson’s plan for bringing water to the salmon. 
Needham explains that the stream that the team thought would be best suited for this was 
Stillwater Creek which flowed into the Sacramento just below the town of Redding. This creek 
was dry in the summer so it could not support salmon. Needham thought that hatcheries would 
be needed as well as “natural propagation.”90 It is interesting that Needham didn’t want to rely 
solely on hatcheries, since at the time, the fisheries biologists, including Needham himself, were 
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questioning the use of hatcheries.91 These biologists wanted hatcheries to be carefully 
evaluated so that their impact could be better understood. This was likely why Needham 
pursued a plan that focused on salmon spawning in the river, rather than primarily relying on a 
hatchery.   
Needham reported on his meeting with Smith and Lindgren to Jackson and included a 
list of immediate steps which included a list of surveys that he wanted undertaken. On June 6, 
1939, Jackson wrote to inform Page that Needham had requested immediate surveys of 
trapping sites and Stillwater Creek.92 Needham’s interest in Stillwater Creek would continue in 
his proposed plan. Lindgren remained in the field after Needham had left and was there for 
several days. After this study he wrote a report which he sent to Needham as well as to Foster 
and Holmes. In the report, Lindgren outlined the problems of trapping fish below Shasta Dam 
and of supplying water to Stillwater Creek. He concluded that both projects were “entirely 
feasible from an engineering point of view.” 93 The Stillwater Creek plan was continuing to gain 
favor among the biologists. 
On August 1, 1939, Needham and Higgins visited Young’s office and discussed the 
Stillwater plan in more detail. Young expressed concern about the cost of the plan and wrote to 
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Lowry asking that field surveys be done so that a cost estimate could be drawn up.94A 
conference was held at Needham’s Stanford office on August 25, 1939, where these plans were 
further discussed. Higgins, Hanson, Smith A. Ketchum, M. M. Ellis, Westfall, Smith and 
Needham were all present. Ketchum was an engineer working for Reclamation; everyone else 
worked for USBF. Needham wrote in a report to Young, “We discussed in detail the location of 
the trapping sites in the main river and the amount of water that should be requested for 
diversion into Stillwater Creek. Additional discussion was carried on with regard to the matter 
of temperature that will prevail in the main river below the dam following completion of 
construction. “95 These discussions continued to be attended mostly by biologists, while 
Reclamation made engineering choices without reference to the fish. Despite Needham’s 
concern about the water temperature, the dam outflow had already been designed to drawn 
from the warm water on the top of Lake Shasta. This meant that there was very little control of 
the temperature of the river downstream and that the dam would warm the river, altering the 
salmon’s habitat and reducing the oxygen in the water.  
A month later Young continued to question the Salmon Salvage Project. On September 
5, 1939, he wrote, “… I question whether his [Needham’s] office will be responsible for final 
decision in all matters pertaining to the salmon problem, although it is my understanding that 
the Bureau of Fisheries has been made responsible for all investigation and that it will submit a 
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report and recommendations regarding the plan designed to solve the problem arising by 
reason of the construction at Shasta Dam.”96 Young appears to have wanted to control what 
was going on in all matters relating to Shasta including the Salmon Salvage project. He 
continued to focus his complaints around money.   
In September, Lindgren wrote a longer report including his further recommendations to 
Needham. The plans for Keswick Dam were still not finalized so Lindgren recommended 
continued discussion with Reclamation. Communication difficulties like this were common. The 
fisheries personnel would ask for information that Reclamation did not yet have and the lack of 
information would delay their plans. Most of Lindgren’s report was spent discussing the 
possible transfer of water from the McCloud River to Stillwater Creek. This would require a 
diversion dam, a canal to move the water, a bridge and a tunnel. Many structures would be 
needed to bring water to fish. Lindgren also commented that at this point it would not be 
“economically justified” to lower the penstocks, the intakes of water to the power plant, to 
release colder water from lower in the reservoir.97 If the dam had been designed with the 
needs of fish in mind from the beginning this would not have been a problem. While it was 
clear that fish would be impacted by the dam before it was designed and built, the salmon were 
not taken into account in this process. This was similar to how events played out on the 
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Columbia River.98It seems that the type of approach that integrated ecology was not taken at 
the time.  
Since Reclamation didn’t employ any biologists, they needed a way to evaluate the 
information they were receiving from USBF. On October 5, 1939, Calland, Acting Supervising 
Engineer for Shasta Dam, wrote a letter to S. O. Harper, the Chief Engineer of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, suggesting that a Board of Consultants be formed to help deal with the Shasta 
salmon. “The general situation was discussed with the Commissioner during his last visit here, 
and it was his suggestion–with which we concur—that upon receipt of the official report and 
recommendation from the Bureau of Fisheries, a board of consulting engineers be appointed to 
consider the report and submit appropriate recommendation as was done at Grand Coulee.”99 
The Columbia River was serving as model for the Central Valley Project–at least in terms of 
dealing with fish because the problems on that river seemed similar to Reclamation.  
Meanwhile federal fisheries personnel continued to work on their Salvage Plans. On 
October 18, Needham sent Page an outline of the Stillwater Plan and strongly urged 
Reclamation to approve this approach to salmon salvage. He also wrote that biological 
investigation should be continued along with the project. In this letter Needham brought up the 
issue of the sports fishery for salmon for the first time, though he mostly seems to have been 
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talking about trout, not salmon.100 Still, sport fishers would later become involved in the project 
and champion the needs of the salmon.  
The California Division of Fish and Game was not very involved in the Central Valley 
Project during this time period. However, on October 18, Lester A. McMillan, executive officer 
of the state Board of Fish and Game Commissioners, wrote a letter to Reclamation asking about 
the project. He stated he was aware that Reclamation and USBF were working on a plan to 
mitigate the effects of Shasta Dam on salmon and stated, “Consequently the California Division 
of Fish and Game is not concerning itself with this work except to cooperate with United States 
agencies in any way possible to assure a complete and logical salvage program so that these 
runs of fish may be preserved, at the least possible maintenance cost.”101 However he was still 
concerned about other aspects of the Central Valley Project and how they would affect aquatic 
life, especially in the San Joaquin River. The State officials would later seek more input into the 
project, expressing concern for the wellbeing of the fish. 
On October 25 to 28, 1939, Holmes, Lindgren, Needham and Ketchum met at Harper’s 
office in Denver, where they discussed fish trapping, specifically using Keswick Dam as a site for 
trapping. Harper, the acting Chief Engineer, was there along with D. C. McConaughy, W. E. 
Blomgern and other unnamed Reclamation engineers. Needham wrote in a report to Jackson, 
“An extremely profitable discussion was had on matters relating to design and location of the 
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various structures which will be necessary to have ready for operation.”102 The group also 
discussed appointing a Board of Consultants, but at that time no possible names were put forth. 
Needham thought that the biologists’ final report would not be ready until March or April 1940, 
but that to move things along more quickly, it might be possible to supply the board with the 
raw data. The group also discussed how to improve “administrative coordination” between 
USBF and Reclamation and whether the California Division of Fish and Game or USBF would be 
in charge of running the project. Needham worried that a change of agency would delay the 
program which was already short on time. They also discussed the possibility of using water 
from Shasta Lake rather than from the McCloud River for the Stillwater plan. D. C. McConaughy, 
an engineer from Reclamation, also at the meeting, wrote a memo about it for Commissioner 
Page. McConaughy would become more involved in the Salmon Salvage Project and write many 
memos about it. McConaughy’s memo dealt mostly with how to trap salmon, though it also 
discussed the Stillwater plan and the possibility of a Board of Consultants. McConaughy 
expressed concern that the size of the salmon run was not clear as, even in the 1939 season, 
some fish were not counted due to faulty equipment.103    
Shortly after this meeting, on November 10, 1939, Harper wrote to Page and 
recommended that Reclamation appoint a consulting board at once so that they would be able 
to deal with the USBF report as soon as it was finished. Harper went on to recommend that this 
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board be the same people who were on a similar board acting for the Columbia Project.104 This 
board consisted of Professor W. F. Durand, an engineer at Stanford; Professor R.D Calkins, an 
economist at the University of California; and Professor Willis H. Rich, a fishery biologist, also at 
Stanford. On November 20, 1939, Harper wrote to Rich and Calkins asking them to be on the 
Board of Consultants for Shasta.105 The next day, Young wrote to Durand to ask the same 
thing.106 Durand also worked for Reclamation as a consulting engineer on other parts of the 
Central Valley Project. The three members of the board were now aware of the Shasta Salmon 
Salvage Project and their upcoming role in it. The board seems to have been chosen entirely by 
Reclamation engineers without USBF having any input. This board would have final approval of 
the plan Needham and his crew developed.  
As a result of the discussion of inter-bureau coordination, Jackson wrote to Page about 
some changes in communication. Foster was to be in charge of fish culture, Holmes in charge of 
trapping, while Needham remained in charge of fieldwork, and carbons of communications 
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which were sent to Foster and Holmes were directed to be sent to Needham as well.107 This 
streamlined things slightly, but did not seem to result in clearer communications. 
Parallel science 
While the California Department of Fish and Game was not involved with creating the 
Salmon Salvage Plan in 1939, they did continue to carry out research on the fish. In 1939, an 
article about the 1938 salmon catch, written by G. H. Clark, was published in California Fish and 
Game, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife’s official journal. The news was not good; 
the commercial catch had been small compared to the previous five years. Offshore fishing in 
Monterey Bay was especially bad, although river fishing in the Sacramento River was actually 
better than in previous years. Clark speculated that this was because salmon were evading the 
nets in the ocean and getting to the river. In 1939, Needham’s investigators counted how many 
salmon made it up the river to Redding Dam. They used this count to estimate how many 
salmon typically made it up the river–and how many salmon the project should try to save. Yet 
it was known that 1939 was a bad year for the fish and not typical. Later on, Young and others 
wanted to use the 1939 estimate even though the 1940 run was much bigger, and they even 
argued that there was no reason to suppose 1939 was atypical. Yet the low catch in 1939 
already suggested that it was not a typical year.  
In October 1939, California Fish and Game published an editorial entitled “Cattle and 
Fish” which compared cattle ranchers to fishery managers. The editorial explained that, “The 
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citizens of California are the owners of the fish along the coast of this State, and the Division of 
Fish and Game has been appointed by the owners to act in the capacity of range boss.”108 The 
editorial then went on to discuss how fish should be managed more like cattle. A 
conservationist is described as someone who “…wears a white collar and an air of high ideals 
and altruistic sentiment.”109 Contrast this image to the “practical nature”110 of the cattle man 
who was a good conservationist “not in spite of, but because of, his desire to make money…”111 
The editorial goes on to argue that the conservationist should be more like the cattleman. The 
editorial assumes that cattle and fish are valuable for the same reasons–because their flesh has 
commercial value. It concludes, “We like to profess the principles of conservation for that 
makes us feel idealistic and altruistic, but actually we could do with less sentiment about our 
natural resources. We need more facing of the fact and the direct application of the cattleman’s 
common sense business management.”112 This was not just a call for pragmatic management of 
fish but also a call to focus on salmon’s economic rather than intrinsic value. It was also a call to 
pay less attention to ecology and more attention to economics. That this editorial was 
published in a professional journal aimed at state officials suggests that the focus on monetary 
values was common among professional fisheries management personnel of the time.   
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Early 1940 
At the beginning of 1940, Young, Lowry, Ketchum and McConaughy from Reclamation, 
Needham and Hanson from USBF, and the members of the Board of Consultants met at 
Redding. The group drove from Redding to Toyon and en route were able to inspect Stillwater 
Creek from the road. A report of the biological investigation had still not been written, so the 
discussion was more general. However the Stillwater Plan seems to have received the most 
attention though there was also a discussion of using Battle Creek. The Board had received “a 
number of documents outlining the general character of these problems” from Needham 
before this meeting.113  
After the meeting McConaughy wrote a memo summarizing the meeting for Page. In the 
memo he provides an estimate of the cost of re-watering Stillwater Creek: $2,920,000, and of 
the whole project including trapping, a hatchery, and trucks to haul fish: $4,645,000. The 
Stillwater Plan represented more than of half of the money in McConaughy’s budget. In his 
conclusion he wrote, “The short time available for construction and the doubtful character of 
any available emergency measures were touched on."114 It is clear that at least some people on 
the team were not feeling optimistic about the salmon’s chances at this point.  
If any traps were to be built, timely construction would be critical. Reclamation asked 
the Board of Consultants to advise them on fish trapping at this time. The Board thought that 
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trapping facilities should be built at Keswick (rather than somewhere else) and issued a short 
report to this effect on January 9, 1940, called “Report on Fish Traps.”115 They wrote that: 
“For these various reasons it is our judgment that in the interest of the salmon ascending the 
river in the vicinity of Redding, especially at spawning time, and in the interest of the protection 
of the people of Redding from undue river hazards, the construction of a re-regulating after-bay 
below Shasta Dam is a desirable feature of this part of the Kennett Project . . .”116   
The Board took into consideration more than just the salmon’s biological needs; they 
were considering human needs as well as the needs of the fish. Page, Jackson and Higgins 
conferred briefly on January 17, 1940. Page asked Jackson to make sure Needham shared his 
data “raw or otherwise” with the Board of Consultants. Page also agreed to write a letter to 
McMillan about jurisdictional issues between state and federal agencies.117 As a result, on the 
25th of January, Page wrote to McMillan, “You may rest assured that the importance of the 
fishing industry to the state of California is not being overlooked, and the plans for properly 
maintaining the industry have been giving me considerable concern.”118 Page may have 
overstated the case a bit. However, he did not go into details about what action he was taking. 
Page remained focused on the commercial rather than the ecological value of the fish. Page 
also invited McMillan to correspond directly with the USBF.119 
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Fieldwork continued through January 1940. Observations were made on Stillwater 
Creek, Battle Creek, Cow Creek and Bear Creek during the high water stages; the spawning 
areas of Deer and Antelope Creeks were surveyed. Fyke nets, a type of fish trap, were set to 
catch the first smolts (young salmon) to migrate downstream in order to better understand this 
phase of the salmon’s lifecycle. Samples of the liquid draining from mines were taken to test for 
pollution.120   
A monthly report for February 1940, stated, “The fyke net fishing on the Sacramento 
River at Redding revealed the start of seaward movement of young salmon on February 1. 
Downstream migrants were also captured in the McCloud River at Baird. The collection of 
weekly mine drainage samples was continued. The salmon count at Battle Creek has also 
continued, except for temporary interruptions due to high water.”121 Quite a bit of fieldwork 
was still ongoing at this point. The date of downstream migration was another important fact 
about the salmon’s life cycle that was not well understood before they began building the dam. 
In March USBF personnel measured salmon redds and continued collecting mine drainage 
which they studied for pollution.122 
Even though the Board of Consultants had made a report in January on the location of 
fish traps, no decision had been made by early March 1940 when Needham wrote to Page to 
urge a quick decision on the location. “In any event the time element is of tremendous 
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importance and unless rapid progress is made, it is extremely like we may lose one or more 
annual runs before trapping facilities are completed and ready for operation. The importance of 
this matter has been emphasized in previous correspondence and cannot be over-emphasized 
now.”123 Needham feared that the traps would not be ready before the dam became 
impassable to salmon. If that happened all of the salmon which would normally spawn above 
the dam would die before they could spawn, severely depleting or even destroying future runs. 
The salmon returned on a four year cycle; if one year’s returning salmon were damaged, it 
would impact that run every fourth year forever. Each annual run is a separate population. 
In March 1940, there was dramatic flooding in the Sacramento River basin. The Bureau 
of Reclamation put out a press release to explain how once Shasta was built these floods would 
be a thing of the past.124 For the people working on the project the effects of the dam on 
flooding were not hypothetical; they saw the real damage that could and did happen. This 
event probably strengthened public support for Shasta Dam.   
Also in early March, Foster and Needham got into a debate about the merits of artificial 
propagation–raising fish in hatcheries. It is unclear how the debate began, but on March 11 
Foster wrote to Needham, “You express the opinion that no run of salmon has been maintained 
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by artificial propagation. In this I must disagree with you.…”125 Foster goes on to argue that 
natural spawning isn’t doing all that well either. He seems to have been fairly invested in 
hatcheries. This was part of a larger scientific debate that was ongoing at the time about the 
impact of hatcheries; they were generally assumed to work, though little data had been 
gathered on their impact.126 Needham wrote back to Foster on March 14, pointing out that 
hatcheries feature in his alternative plans. He goes on to say “… our thesis is that even though 
small runs have been maintained artificially, these artificial runs in no case, so far as we know, 
have been large enough to affect the total commercial run of the river system.”127 Needham 
argued that all the commercial runs rely on fish from natural spawning and that hatchery fish 
play a small role.  
In reply to Needham’s concern about constructing and positioning traps as quickly as 
possible, Chief Engineer Harper wrote, “We are more concerned about completion of works for 
care of the fish after they are trapped than about completion of the traps themselves. It is our 
understanding that if such works are not completed by the time they are needed, the only 
possible method of disposing of the fish will be to dump them in the river above Shasta Dam, 
which probably will result in a huge loss.”128 Reclamation engineers were not even sure that 
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they could have their mitigation efforts in place before they finished the dam and were having 
to pick and choose between different mitigation strategies.   
Meanwhile, work continued on developing an overall plan for the salmon. On March 27, 
1940, Senior Engineer Grant Bloodgood of Reclamation wrote a memo about the technical 
details of a canal from the McCloud River to supply water for the Stillwater Creek Plan. His cost 
estimate for the project was $3,104,069, which was a bit more than McConaughy’s estimate.129 
In a cover letter for Bloodgood’s memo, Lowry wrote, “It cannot be emphasized too strongly 
that, due to the character of the material and the rugged topography of the country through 
which the canal must be located, the construction of the canal will be difficult and 
expensive.”130 He goes on to say it will also be expensive to operate and that, if possible, 
another plan should be chosen instead. His objections seem to come from an understanding of 
the engineering difficulties rather than a feeling that salmon are not worth bothering with.   
The report 
On April 6, 1940, Hanson, Needham and Smith produced a report which stated what 
they had learned about salmon and proposed four different possible plans for salvaging the 
salmon.131 This started a debate as to which plan should be adopted. The plans were labeled 
Stillwater Plan, Battle Creek Plan, Sacramento River Natural Spawning Plan and Transfer to 
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Trinity River. None of the plans involved a fish ladder over Shasta Dam as the dam was 
considered too high for fish to climb, and scientists were not sure that the fish would migrate in 
the slack water of Shasta Lake.132 For each of the first three plans, they provided an outline, 
estimated the cost, and provided a numbered list of advantages and disadvantages of the plan. 
(The forth plan was thought to be not worth considering and was only given a few paragraphs) 
The fisheries biologists favored the Stillwater Plan. They devoted the most page space to 
explaining this plan and listed more advantages for this plan than for any other. The Stillwater 
plan was also the most expensive. 
The Stillwater plan was the only one of these plans that Needham and his people had 
written to Reclamation about directly. This plan called for fish to be trapped and brought to 
Stillwater Creek to spawn. To make the seasonal creek fit for salmon year round, water would 
be brought from the McCloud River overland to the creek. Water from Lake Shasta was 
considered unusable because reservoir water had been shown to be harmful to salmon in other 
places. The Creek would provide enough habitat for the spring run and part of the fall run. To 
maintain the rest of the fall run, a hatchery would be built along Stillwater Creek. It was 
estimated that it would cost $4,254,000 to build the necessary infrastructure and $54,190 
annually to operate the project. Stillwater Creek was favored in part because there were no 
other water users and no need to purchase water rights. 
The second plan detailed in the report was called the Battle Creek Plan. It involved 
building a hatchery (or expanding the existing Fisheries hatchery) on Battle Creek and trapping 
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fish downstream and hauling them to Battle Creek. The plan called for 18 trucks to haul the fish. 
There was no cost estimate for this plan. An alternative mentioned within the Battle Creek Plan 
would involve transferring some or all of the spring runs to Deer Creek. The report states that, 
“The only outstanding advantages of the Battle Creek plan over the Stillwater Plan are its lower 
initial costs and the fact that it would not entail a power loss at Shasta Power Plant.” 133 Both of 
these points seem more important than the report acknowledged. A major disadvantage of this 
plan was that it would involve entrusting the fall run solely to artificial propagation about which 
Needham had expressed serious doubts. Other disadvantages listed in the plan included the 
unreliability of the water supply, competition between native and hauled salmon in Deer and 
Battle Creeks, and the need to construct roads. 
The next plan was called the Sacramento River Natural Spawning plan. Foster is credited 
with suggesting this plan. The plan involved building racks across the Sacramento River to 
prevent fall run salmon from migrating upstream–forcing them to spawn lower in the river. This 
was based on studies that suggested there was room for 25,000 female salmon to spawn in the 
river between Keswick Dam and Battle Creek. Spring run salmon would be trapped and 
transferred to Battle Creek or Deer Creek. The biologists had many concerns about this plan. 
They were worried about pollution from disused mines getting into the river, about the water 
temperature, the river being too hot for salmon, and about flooding damaging the rack. It was 
estimated that it would cost $ 1,595,500 to build the infrastructure for this plan and $40,380 to 
operate the plan. The authors wrote that the main advantage of the plan was that it had the 
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lowest capital costs of any of the plans. It also provided the greatest “natural spawning area” of 
any of the plans. However, they also wrote, “The most serious disadvantage of this plan is the 
uncertainty of its success.” They were doubtful that the fish would behave in an orderly fashion.  
The final plan mentioned in the report was called “Transfer to Trinity River;” only three 
paragraphs describe this plan. This plan would have involved hauling all the fish that spawned 
in the Sacramento River into the nearby Trinity River. The biologists worried that introducing a 
new “race” (or what we might call an ecotype) of salmon into the Trinity might cause problems. 
This was a very early example of this type of concern. Two dams were planned for the Trinity 
River. The Trinity River is a tributary to the Klamath River and thus part of a different watershed 
than the Sacramento. The Chinook salmon of the Trinity River are thus a separate population. 
All three of the plans that Needham, Smith, and Hanson discussed in detail required 
shipping salmon from place to place. The Stillwater plan involved transferring salmon to 
Stillwater Creek and building and maintaining a hatchery there. Likewise the Battle Creek plan 
involved transferring salmon to Battle and Deer Creeks. The Sacramento River Natural 
Spawning plan was to hold the fall-run salmon in the Sacramento River below Redding, but the 
spring run would be transferred to Battle Creek.134 While the fisheries biologists thought it a 
bad idea to ship salmon between watersheds, they did not anticipate problems with shipping 
salmon within a watershed.  
The Hanson, Smith and Needham report published in 1940 is notable for its dismal 
outlook for the success of the project. For example, “only experience in the actual salvage work 
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itself will indicate the efficacy of salvage measures and serve as a guide to future procedures” 
was one of the more optimistic statements about the salmon’s future.135 But there was much 
doubt that any of the plans would be effective. The biological experts did not have much faith 
that the salmon could be saved. The report also complained about the limited amount of time 
that biologists had to work on the problem compared to the amount of time that the dam had 
been planned.  
The report included five appendices, the first of which featured tables, and the others 
were mini-reports in their own right, including one about the water temperature and one about 
pollution from former mine sites.    
The appendix on water temperature used Lake Mead (behind Hoover/Bolder Dam) as a 
point of comparison. O. E. Sette, the author of the report, constructed a mathematical model 
and compared the theoretical temperatures of Lake Mead with the actual temperatures, then 
applied this model to Shasta Lake. This is an impressive bit of math, but the report came to no 
conclusions. Still it is important to note that the possibility that water from the dam would be 
harmful to the fish because it would warm the waters of the Sacramento River was considered 
before the dam was built. Higher water temperatures did in fact become a problem but were 
not addressed until the 1990’s. At that time a Temperature Control Device was installed which 
draws water from different elevations of the lake to keep the outflow within a temperature 
range suitable for salmon.  
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The next appendix was called “Fish-Catching Facilities for Shasta Project” and was 
written by Harlan B. Holmes and O. W. Lindgren. The report began by stating, “… it has not 
been determined where the fish-catching facilities for the Shasta Dam Project will be located, it 
has become desirable to make generalized plans for such facilities without respect to specific 
dam or powerhouse structures.” It seems they still had not decided where the traps would be 
despite the Board of Consultants’ report which came out in January and urged a quick decision 
on the matter. The rest of the report contained technical details about best ways to construct a 
fish trap.  
The next appendix to the 1940 report was titled “Study of the Extent to which the 
Natural Flow of Stillwater Creek Can Be Used to Replace Diverted Flow from the McCloud River” 
by Holmes and Lindgren. It is a study of how much water would need to be diverted from the 
McCloud to make the Stillwater Plan work. The McCloud River was one of the rivers which 
would be blocked by the dam, so diverting the water would not harm Chinook runs there more 
than the dam itself already would. They estimated that if the flow could be regulated on a daily 
basis, about 11,500 cubic feet of water could be saved by using the “natural flow” of the creek 
instead of just diverting water.  
The final appendix was “Mine Tunnel Drainage in The Shasta Reservoir Area” by Paul A 
Shaw. There were several creeks near Shasta that were contaminated with mine drainage, and 
this report looked at whether contaminated water would enter Shasta Lake and thus the 
Sacramento River where it could potentially harm the fish. This study looked at copper, zinc and 
pH levels. The report noted that five streams had pollution levels high enough to kill trout (and 
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presumably salmon) and recommended further studies to determine if the pollution came 
primarily from “tunnel water or natural runoff.”136 If tunnel water was the major source, then 
the report recommended that “definite consideration” should be given to sealing the tunnels 
and to requiring active mines to treat their runoff. This was technically possible but would 
require funding from Reclamation.  
Responses to the report 
The report was met with a variety of reactions. Young, the construction engineer for 
Reclamation, was not pleased. He wrote: 
“In view of the considerable expenditure which is now generally regarded as necessary for 
salvaging migratory fish and the more or less constant trend toward higher cost as investigation 
and discussion reveal additional difficulties and more exacting requirements, it seems 
appropriate to recognize some limit in expenditure that will represent the maximum economic 
justification. It is believed that the establishment of such a limit would serve to circumscribe the 
scope of investigation and discussion. Unreconcilable [sic] expedients would be eliminated and 
our attention concentrated on measures known to be sound from all stand points.”137   
Here Young focused on the economic value of the fish once again. 
Meanwhile, Needham was beginning to worry about when the dam would start blocking 
the salmon’s access to their spawning grounds. He was already worried about the 1941 fall run. 
“…We think that the fall run of 1941 can spawn above the dam and its progeny can return to 
the sea safely, provided there is no obstruction at the dam site. If the salmon are blocked in 
1941, a ladder should be provided or the fish should be trapped and hauled above the dam site. 
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As other features of a salvage plan, such as possible hatcheries, would not be needed in 1941, 
but would be needed in 1942...”138 Thus in the spring of 1940, Needham thought they had a bit 
less than two years to get the plan in place. This was not that long considering that Reclamation 
had not yet chosen a course of action. The longer they waited to decide, the less time they 
would have to build the infrastructure. If facilities needed for the salvage were not in place in 
time, there was potential to permanently damage salmon populations.  
Yet the debate about the report continued .On April 15, 1940, Jackson, the acting 
commissioner of USBF, wrote to Page, “The reason one specific plan has not been decided upon 
finally is that the one most satisfactory from the standpoint of salmon biology is the most 
expensive from a construction standpoint, and the investigators themselves properly raise the 
question as to its economic justification.” 139 Even the biologists who wrote the Salmon Salvage 
Plan were unclear about their own values. They felt drawn to the salmon, but they couldn’t 
justify the cost of the project in rational economic terms, and they didn’t use another model to 
argue for the fish. (Hedgpeth had previously talked about the value of the salmon for their own 
sake, but he was the junior member of the team and didn’t have a lot of say in the final report.) 
The Reclamation engineers were thus able to use economic logic to argue for a plan 
with less chance of success. Walter wrote, “The report shows that the board had great difficulty 
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in finding economic justification for the expenditure of even that amount of money and was 
obliged to rely in part on such intangible items as value of the knowledge gained concerning 
fish, in order to approximate such justification.” He also noted, “It appears obvious that there 
should be at least some connection between the value of a natural resource and the cost of its 
preservation…” For Walter, cost/benefit type analyses were very important in how he saw the 
salmon. He also complained that, “Regardless of the cost involved, the Bureau of Fisheries 
apparently is unwilling to recommend anything which it considers might be, in the slightest 
degree, unsuccessful or short of perfection.”140 Since the USBF people felt doubtful that even 
their most favored Stillwater Plan would save the salmon, this complaint does not seem 
justified. Reclamation had asked for a biological option, but now they were rejecting the 
biologists’ opinions based on economic considerations.  
On April 27, 1940, Young instructed the Board of Consultants that, “It is our opinion that 
further progress on the determination of salvage measures must be predicated on economic 
considerations.”141 Again, he was focusing the process on salmon’s economic value and 
continued to ignore any concept of intrinsic value.  
Another reaction to the report was a press release put out by Reclamation, which 
continued to focus on the economic value of the salmon. For example, the press release stated,  
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“There is evidence that most of the salmon caught in the ocean from Mendocino County south 
to Monterey are spawned in the Sacramento-San Joaquin river system, and therefore the 
commercial value of the Sacramento salmon must be the value of the ocean plus the river catch. 
For the ten years from 1929 to 1938, this has averaged $196,000 annually in prices paid to the 
fishermen alone.”142   
This is used to explain why the salmon were worth salvaging. Thus Reclamations’ public focus 
remained on economics and also on the commercial fishery.  
On May 10, 1940, Needham spoke at the Sacramento Valley Council local conservation 
committee of the state Chamber of Commerce. However, after Needham gave his report on 
progress at Shasta, things got off track. “Mr. Charles Bonham of Gridley, representing a 
conservation department of the American Legion, alleged that commercial operation on the 
lower rivers and bays were more injurious to the migratory fish runs–salmon, steelhead, striped 
bass and shad–than dams and canal diversions. He proposed a resolution calling for stopping all 
commercial fishing on all fresh water streams in California. A representative of the commercial 
fish companies was present and countered Bohram’s arguments rather heatedly. The squabble 
ended in no decision or action of any kind.” 143 The committee seems to have been torn about 
the causes of the decline of the salmon and what they should do about it. There may also have 
been a class issue as the committee members were probably middle to upper class while 
commercial fishermen would have been lower class, meaning they would have had less political 
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power. Taylor discusses how class differences between anglers and commercial fishers created 
tensions on the Columbia, and it is likely that a similar dynamic was in play in California.144   
Foster’s plan 
On May 14, 1940, Fred J. Foster of the Bureau of Fisheries put out his own plan for 
salvaging the fish. Foster was not part of the investigative team, but he had helped with the 
study. He was higher up the chain of command than Needham, and had differing views on 
hatcheries. He probably felt this gave him authority to design a program even though he was 
less familiar with the circumstances than the investigative team. Foster’s plan had five main 
points. 1) The spring run would be trapped and hauled to Deer Creek and Battle Creek, 2) the 
early part of the fall run would be trapped and hauled to a holding pound near Battle Creek, 
while (3) the rest of the fall run would be held in the river with racks. 4) A hatchery would be 
constructed at the Coleman site on Battle Creek, and finally (5) USBF would abandon its station 
on Battle Creek except for the previously mentioned holding pound. Despite Foster’s previous 
arguments in favor of hatcheries this plan relies mostly on the salmon spawning in the wild. 
Still, Foster failed to support Needham’s favored Stillwater Plan. Foster’s report is also much 
more optimistic than Hanson, Smith and Needham’s report, as Foster does not dwell on the 
possibility that the program will not work. In fact Foster thought that after the dam was 
completed it would be possible to increase the size of the run “to the capacity of available 
spawning area.”145 Foster’s plan was much closer to the final plan than any of the plans in the 
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Hanson, Smith and Needham report. While Foster had not been involved in the biological study, 
his plan was more acceptable than those proposed by Hanson, Smith and Needham, because it 
was cheaper and also hewed closer to the accepted wisdom on hatcheries. 
The Board of Consultants weighs in 
On June 21, 1940, the Board of Consultants published its own report on what was to be 
done about the salmon. This report valued salmon in multiple ways, but all were extrinsic. In 
fact, the report included several pages discussing the value of the fish; however, most of these 
pages were taken up discussing what proportion of the offshore catch of salmon is from the 
Sacramento River. Like the other reports, it continued to discuss the monetary value of the fish. 
However, it also mentioned other types of values. For example the report called salmon a 
“natural food resource” which focuses on their extrinsic value but not on their monetary 
value.146  The report continued to say, “Indeterminate allowances for the value of those runs to 
sport fisherman, to the fish trade, social values, etc. may bring the total valuation to a figure 
somewhat above [the monetary value to commercial fishermen].”147 It is a bit unclear what the 
board meant by “social values”. Here–it seems to be something like the value to society and 
something they consider hard to measure monetarily. The Board also talked about the 
“recreational value”148 of the fish, which conveys the enjoyment the sports fishers get from 
fishing. 
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Still the Board felt that sports fishing was “of small or indeed negligible importance.”149 
They did not give a lot of space in the report to it. They wrote “… we do not consider that the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is responsible for this phase of the broad problem of fish life in the 
Sacramento River and make, therefore no recommendations regarding sport fishing in the usual 
sense of the term.”150 Thus the Board didn’t think they had to consider the issues. However 
anglers would become some of the more vocal voices urging the conservation of the salmon.  
The Board of Consultants’ report summarized each of the three plans and listed 
advantages and disadvantages for each; these were similar to what was written in Hanson, 
Smith and Needham’s report. Before explaining their plan, the Board wrote “Whatever is done 
involves a serious hazard and may well end in more or less complete failure insofar as 
maintaining the present supply of adult salmon is concerned”151 They were not confident that 
they could control nature, or fix everything with technology. 
The Board recommended a combination of the Sacramento River Natural Spawning Plan 
and the Battle Creek Plan “with the role of Deer Creek left open.”152 Their reasoning was “[the 
Sacramento River Plan] appears to involve the least capital expenses, while at the same time it 
offers, in our judgment the best biological conditions for the immediate salvage and for the 
future build of salmon in the Sacramento River.”153 This plan featured three river racks to space 
out the naturally spawning fish, a holding pond on Battle Creek, a hatchery and four trucks for 
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hauling fish. The Board’s report estimated the capital costs at $1,064,500 to $ 1,082,500 
depending on whether a holding pond was built at Deer Creek and annual operating costs at 
$35,000.  
On July 1st of 1940, the organizational framework of the project changed when the 
Biological Survey and USBF were merged to form the Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), a new 
agency with a more ecological outlook. This also meant that the Bureau of Fisheries, which had 
been in the Department of Commerce, was now in the Department of the Interior. Ira 
Gabrielson was appointed as Director of the new agency and Charles E. Jackson, who had been 
the Acting Commissioner of USBF, became the Assistant Director. 
Hanson, Smith and Needham’s report was sent to members of the California 
Department of Fish and Game, and on July 1, 1940, McMillan wrote to Jackson to request that 
his people be allowed to present their views. This was after the Board of Consultants had 
already written their final report; apparently the Board had not considered consulting the state 
officials before then.  
McMillan also had strong opinions about what was and what was not Reclamation’s 
responsibility. He wrote, “It is the full responsibility of the United States Government to see 
that this run of salmon is adequately provided for so that there is no loss of fish or lack of 
facilities for existing salmon to spawn, and to provide for the increase in the numbers of 
spawning salmon.”154 He thought that Reclamation should not only have to maintain the 
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current runs, but be responsible for restoration as well. These views were dramatically different 
from those of Reclamation personnel. However, Reclamation held the purse strings in this case, 
and so their views held more weight.  
Meanwhile, the dam construction was proceeding rapidly. In July 1940, the Shasta Dam 
head tower was completed,155 a key piece of infrastructure needed so that they could pour the 
concrete. The head tower was connected by cables to tail towers each of which was on tracks 
and could be moved. The wet concrete was placed in enormous buckets which were lifted up 
the head tower and moved along the cables between the head tower and the tail towers. The 
buckets were dumped into frames and men spread the concrete out. Work went on 24 hours a 
day.  
On July 22, 1940, Chief Engineer Harper wrote to McMillan, sending him a copy of the 
Board’s report and suggesting that the state people could meet with the Board on July 29. 
McMillan was out of the office when Harper’s letter arrived, so G. H. Clark replied instead. He 
said that there was no great disagreement but that the state people would like to talk to the 
Board. Clark also wanted to know, “In the event that the main Sacramento River holding plan 
and the utilization of Battle Creek and Deer Creek are adopted, what will be done with the 
salmon if it is later discovered that the fish in the Sacramento River will not or cannot spawn in 
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the main river?”156 This was an important point which had not been properly addressed as 
many of the biologists felt that the success of the main river spawning plan was in doubt.  
Harper did not share McMillan’s view of Reclamation’s responsibility. In a letter to 
Durand he wrote, “It is the view of this office that, in making recommendations in regard to the 
Stillwater Creek plan, the Board should distinguish carefully between the salvage of and the 
building up of the existing run. The former has been admitted as a responsibility of the Central 
Valley Project; the latter is a matter for a decision of policy-making officials of the 
Government.”157 The contrast that he draws here is very interesting. Harper felt Reclamation 
was responsible for maintenance of salmon but not for their restoration.   
The role of the investigative team was not yet over, although they had written their 
report. Harper requested, “Definite recommendation on all features, or definite dates on which 
such recommendations may be expected, would be most helpful and you are urged to submit 
one or the other at an early date.”158 Even though Reclamation had the Board’s 
recommendations and the report they asked for, they still seem to be complaining that they 
didn’t have enough data, even though they had not given Fisheries the engineering data when 
                                                          
156 G. H. Clark to Harper, July 26, 1940, Box 127 file: fish conservation May 1940 to Oct 1940, 
Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY 10, Department of the 
Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115 NARA–Rocky Mountain Region 
(Denver). 
157 Harper to Durand, July 30, 1940, Box 127 file: fish conservation May 1940 to Oct 1940, 
Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY 10, Department of the 
Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115 NARA–Rocky Mountain Region 
(Denver). 
158 Harper to Needham, September 7, 1940, Box 127 file: fish conservation May 1940 to Oct 
1940, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY 10, Department of 
the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115 NARA–Rocky Mountain Region 
(Denver). 
78 
 
asked. Still, the USFWS biologists seem to have cooperated as on September 10, 1940, 
Needham sent a tentative program and budget for year 1941 to Young. This consisted of a list 
of studies to be carried out at an estimated cost of $20,000.159 
On August 12, 1940, the Board of Consultants and Needham met with McMillan, Taft 
and Clark for the State Division of Fish and Game to discuss the Board’s earlier report. After this 
meeting McMillan submitted a letter stating his office’s concerns. The state officials wanted to 
have a better backup plan in place in case the Sacramento River Natural Spawning Plan failed. 
Since no one was sure that the plan would work, their concerns seem well founded. They were 
also concerned about the fact that more spring run salmon had been counted that year and 
asked the Board to recommend more trucks. They also requested that an official agreement be 
drawn up stating the “jurisdiction and responsibility” of each agency.160  
On Friday September 13, 1940, Charles E. Jackson, Fred J. Foster and Harlan B. Holmes 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service met with D.C McConaughy, Smith A. Ketchum and Nelson B. 
Hunt of Reclamation in the Sir Francis Drake Hotel in San Francisco. McConaughy announced 
that Keswick would include a fish trap and that bids would hopefully open on the first of the 
year.161 The USFWS personnel were generally pleased by this as they felt it was the best 
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possible trapping solution and had been waiting for many months for a trap location to be 
decided on. They also discussed the details of the salvage plan such as the number of racks to 
be placed in the river. The group debated whether Reclamation was responsible for protecting 
the interests of sports fishers. They decided to let the Commissioner of Reclamation make that 
decision.162 
After the meeting Foster, Holmes, Needham and McConaughy went to Redding.163 That 
weekend they “spent [time] in examination of the site of the proposed structures.”164 Hanson 
joined the party on Saturday. The following Monday, Needham and McConaughy met with 
Young in Sacramento. They discussed the California Department of Fish and Game’s concerns 
about the salmon. Young claimed that the fish problems could not be solved until the 
engineering problems were solved.165 Young generally viewed these as separate issues, even 
though they were closely linked. In fact some of the engineering solutions impacted the fish, so 
it would have been better to take a holistic view of the problems. 
Young continued to balk at spending money on the salmon. He wrote, “It is our opinion 
that expenditures for the fish investigation should be restricted in the same way it has been 
necessary to curtail other features of the project, examples of which are failure to award 
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contracts on Contra Costa, Medera and Friant-Kern canals. “166 He seems to have felt that the 
salmon were getting more than their fair share, even though they were in fact getting very 
little.  
However, Harper was more generous to the USFWS than Young had been. He wrote to 
Page: 
“This office is in sympathy with the Supervising Engineer’s [Young’s] vexation at the ever 
increasing amount requested by the Fish and Wildlife Service. It is believed, however, that these 
requests result chiefly from inability of the officials of that Service to prepare accurate 
estimates, or from careless preparation of such estimates, rather than from inefficient 
expenditure of funds provided or from over-investigation. So far as this office is able to judge, 
the information sought is necessary to the development of adequate measure for salvage of the 
fish run, and I do not concur in the Supervising Engineer’s view that fund for such investigations 
should be arbitrarily curtailed .“167  
 
Even though Harper agreed with Young that costs were escalating, he also thought the USFWS 
people had a valid need for money and was willing to keep funding them. 
 
On October 5, 1940, the Board of Consultants published a Supplemental Report to 
address the concerns of California’s Fish and Game Department. One of these proposed ideas 
was to provide Stillwater Creek with water from the reservoir to create year-round flow to help 
create an alternative to the Main River Spawning Plan. This was similar to Hanson, Smith and 
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Needham’s Stillwater Plan, but used a different source of water. It was doubted that reservoir 
water would work as well as river water for raising salmon. The Board was not willing to spend 
what it deemed “a very considerable figure”168 on a safety feature, preferring instead to focus 
the money on the main plan. The report states, “We have taken the practical stand that the 
value of the salmon runs affected are not sufficient to justify large expenditures on multiple 
plans for their maintenance; that one general plan should be selected from the several 
proposed and that every effort should be made to make that plan successful.”169 This decision 
was based more on economics than on biology. The Board felt there was no money for a 
backup plan. 
However the Board did approve of the second safety measure proposed by the state 
officials–experimentally transporting adult salmon over the dam as this would be inexpensive. 
However, this measure would have to wait until after the dam was completed.170 It is unclear if 
these experiments were ever carried out. The Board also approved of the California Fish and 
Game Department’s suggestion to expand the planed hatchery facilities, writing, “The further 
development of a more scientific program of artificial propagation is perhaps the most 
important safety factor that can be suggested… “171 The Board also increased the number of 
trucks they recommended be provided from four to seven. Overall the supplementary report 
did not make any major changes to the salvage program. 
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The final plan involved both natural and artificial propagation of salmon. Of the plans in 
the report, it most closely resembled The Sacramento River Natural Spawning plan, but it also 
had features of the Battle Creek Plan and was very similar to Foster’s plan published after the 
report. The new plan was not given a name. There were three phases from Jan 1 to June 15: the 
spring run salmon would be transferred to Deer Creek, where they would spawn “naturally,” 
and to Battle Creek where the eggs would be harvested for the hatchery. The second phase 
would take place between June 16 and Oct 10, and salmon would be transferred from the 
Sacramento to Battle Creek for artificial propagation. The third phase would take place 
between Oct 1 and Dec 31 and would involve trapping the fall-run salmon in the Sacramento 
using fish racks to force them to remain there to spawn. 172 
The path to deciding on this final plan was heavily influenced by values. The Board chose 
to value the salmon in an economic way and thus to minimize spending rather than maximize 
the salmon’s chances of survival. The process of creating the plan was long and often 
frustrating with many deadlines being missed. Reclamation personal were aware of the 
problem as early as 1936 when Honnold wrote to Young about California law which protected 
salmon. Still, research need for the plan did not begin until 1938, and the plan was not finalized 
until 1940, two years after construction of Shasta Dam began. During that time most people 
working to produce the plan focused on the extrinsic value of the fish rather than their intrinsic 
value. 
  
                                                          
172 Ibid., 7. 
83 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. AFTER THE SHASTA SALMON SALVAGE PLAN 
 
Now that a plan had been completed, it required execution. Researching and writing the 
plan had involved a complex and often not fully expressed conflict over values. Putting the plan 
into action would involve more of the same. Conflicts between USFWS and Reclamation over 
funding would continue. Eventually some parts of the plan would be abandoned. In addition, 
the entrance of the United States into World War II in December 1941 would shift the focus of 
the Central Valley Project from agricultural needs to industrial needs and reduce the resources 
available for the salmon salvage.  
Around this time the Bureau of Reclamation underwent some reorganization. On 
November 6, 1940, Walker Young, the supervising engineer of the Central Valley Project, was 
promoted to Assistant Chief Engineer. In this role he had less direct contact with Shasta but 
continued to influence the salmon project. To replace Young, R. S. Calland, who had been 
assistant supervising engineer on the Central Valley Project, was promoted to Acting 
Supervising Engineer.173 
In the fall of 1940 the biologists began noticing that there were many more salmon than 
in the previous year, 1939, which was so far the only year that fish had been counted. The 
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number of spring run salmon at the Anderson-Cottonwood Dam was nearly twice what it had 
been in earlier counts.174 Since they had so little baseline information, it was hard for them to 
decide what to do with this new data. The problem of deciding which data to use as a baseline 
would become contentious later. The number of fish that had to be accounted for had 
implications for the cost of the project. On December 13, 1940, Young wrote a letter to Page in 
which he said he saw no reason to think that 1940 should be considered a base year rather than 
1939. Of course using the lower number from 1939 would be better for Reclamation because if 
there were fewer fish then less money could be spent on them.175 
 
1941 
An agreement between Reclamation and USFWS went into effect on January 1, 1941. 
The formalization of the agreement was probably promoted by the California Fish and Game 
Department’s request for clarification. The agreement itself is quite short–just barely over two 
typewritten pages. It basically said that the Fish and Wildlife Service would investigate the 
problem and provide information to Reclamation and that in return Reclamation would provide 
Fish and Wildlife a sum not exceeding $2,350 for work done between the finalizing of the 
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agreement and the end of the fiscal year on June 30, 1941.176 This was very little money for a 
project of the size and scope of the Shasta Dam Salmon Salvage.  
On January 15, 1941, Needham sent Calland, now holding Young’s job, his proposed 
budget for the first half of fiscal year 1941. His total estimated cost was $7,300 which was more 
than double what the agreement allowed. Needham wanted to pay for an assistant aquatic 
biologist, a junior aquatic biologist, laborers, fish counters and truck drivers. In addition, he 
needed to pay for the trucks and a variety of small structures such as fish traps.177 Needham 
was not requesting anything unreasonable here. Needham believed that left over money from 
what had previously been allotted to the fisheries commission would cover $6,000 of the 
expenses. Needham didn’t know about the new agreement and doesn’t seem to have been 
consulted in the writing of it. 
On Tuesday February 11, 1941, Bashore, McConaughy and Higgins, all Reclamation 
engineers, had a conference in Denver. They discussed the cost of building the hatchery, which 
they estimated to be about $50,000 and which they thought was a high price. One of the topics 
that came up was the need to have someone from the USFWS work with Reclamation 
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engineers in Denver.178 As result of this conference, Jackson wrote to Foster to ask him to 
correspond more directly with Reclamation.179 
While the salmon project was still slow to start, work on Shasta was progressing rapidly. 
On May 3, 1941, the millionth cubic yard of concrete was poured in Shasta Dam.180 This was the 
result not only of careful engineering but also of much manual labor. The rapid progress of the 
dam building meant that the biologists had to struggle to keep the salmon conservation efforts 
meeting deadlines imposed by construction.  
On June 30, 1941, a new agreement between USFWS and Reclamation went into effect 
after the first agreement expired. This agreement was much more favorable to the USFWS than 
the previous one. The USFWS had the same obligations to complete the project, but 
Reclamation provided more realistic expenses. Reclamation would loan the trucks for the 
duration of the project, pay for the construction of structures needed for salvage, and provide 
$22,000 for operations.181   
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Now that the Shasta Salmon Salvage Plan was finalized and was being put into 
operation, Needham, Smith and Hanson all remained with the project as aquatic biologists. 
They were joined by Dr. James W. Moffett who was given the title Associate Aquatic Biologist. 
Lewis P. Parker also started work as an Assistant Aquatic Biologist with the Shasta Salmon 
Salvage Project.182 
The first transfer experiment occurred in 1941. This first season of transporting salmon 
was seen as test of the concept. Between June 3 and June 30, nine hundred twenty salmon 
were transferred from the Sacramento River and Redding to Deer Creek. The salmon were 
trapped in rather make-shift contraptions, which caught 11 to 49 fish at a time. The fish would 
be caught and then forced to swim up the fish ladder at Redding Dam and into a 500 gallon 
steel loading tank. The loading tank was then emptied into a tank on the back of a truck. The 
salmon were next driven 65 miles to Deer Creek. This took about two hours. At Deer Creek the 
salmon were dumped through a tube “made by attaching two pieces of half-round galvanized 
iron irrigation flume together” into a holding tank; the fish were held there for about half an 
hour and then released into Deer Creek.183 This complex process must have stressed the 
salmon. Indeed, about 30 percent of the transferred fish had died by the end of August.184  
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Continued interest in salmon from the public prompted Reclamation to issue another 
press release in July of 1941.185 Entitled “Salvage of Salmon in the Sacramento River,” the press 
release started out by discussing the “annual $300,000 salmon run of the Sacramento River.” In 
this case the commercial value of the fish was front and center. Other discussions of the 
problem focused on the romantic lifecycle of the fish empathizing with the Chinooks’ intrinsic 
value. Otherwise it was a fairly bland document focusing on the construction work still to be 
done for the project.186 
In addition, the July 1941 issue of California Fish and Game, the scientific journal 
published by the state’s Division of Fish and Game, featured a history of Livingston Stone 
written by Joel W. Hedgpeth, who was no longer working on the Salmon Salvage Project. This 
article helps highlight the differing views of the value of salmon. While this paper was primarily 
historical, the author also commented on the current state of salmon in California. He wrote, “It 
is not unreasonable to assume that Livingston Stone, were he alive today, would admit that 
another hatchery seems a poor substitute for California’s once magnificent river system and 
that here at last is the doom of the salmon which he foretold.”187 This was in tune with most 
scientific writing of the time, most of which seemed very pessimistic about the future of Central 
Valley Chinook salmon. However, perhaps Hedgpeth’s most interesting statement was this: 
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“To the engineer who plans the dams and the politician who promotes them for the glory of his 
constituents, the salmon have little sentimental value, although in fairness to these gentlemen it 
must be said that the fish had been given up for lost in California long before this, and they 
could hardly be expected to share the biologist’s peculiar interest in the preservation of a 
species for its own sake.” 188  
It was rare for a scientific journal of the period to reference the intrinsic value of salmon. 
Hedgpeth is suggesting not only that he values the fish intrinsically, but that other biologists do 
so as well.   
Reclamation remained focused on the human rather than the environmental impact of 
the dam. On August 1, 1941, bids were received for building Keswick Dam and Power Plant 
about nine miles downstream of Shasta on the Sacramento River.189 This smaller dam would 
help regulate the backwash and generate more electricity. It also formed a barrier for salmon, 
marking the farthest upstream the fish would be able to reach after its completion. The 
contract included construction of fish traps. The press release stressed the electric power 
generated at the dam, far more than its role in the irrigation system; this shift would become 
more prominent after the U.S. entered the Second World War.  
About two weeks later, on August 15, 1941, the bids for Balls Ferry rack and trap, which 
was part of the river spawning plan, opened. This was the farthest downstream of the fish racks 
planned for the project. The structure would consist of a 600 foot long rack across the river, 
with a trap the on east side, and a cableway. The contractor was allotted 120 days to build the 
structure. The press release mentions the monetary value of salmon ($300,000 annually), 
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continuing a strong focus on the commercial value above all others.190 Sometime between late 
August and early October, construction began on Keswick Dam. .191  
Spawning that fall began on September 10 and continued until October 25.192 Since 
there were many Chinook native to Deer Creek present as well as the salmon transferred in 
June, and because tracking methods were rather primitive, it was hard to judge if the 
transplanted salmon spawned well. Still the scientists believed, based on where they recovered 
the marked bodies of the fish, that this experiment taught them “that salmon removed from 
the Sacramento River and transferred to Deer Creek will distribute themselves similar to native-
run salmon and will spawn naturally in that stream.”193 
In November 1941, fyke netting, a type of fish trap was installed in Deer Creek. This 
netting was used to capture salmon smolts, young fish that have begun the physiological 
changes necessary to live in the ocean, migrating downstream. This was done so that the 
biologists could find out when the young fish began their journey as this was one of the basic 
parts of the salmon lifecycle that was still not well understood after the original investigation.194 
The investigators had used fyke netting for similar purposes the previous season. On November 
10, 1941, Reclamation put out a press release about the soon-to-begin construction of Coleman 
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Hatchery. This release focused on the technical aspects of the hatchery. Bidding for the 
construction contract began on November 27, 1941.195 
However, ten days later, the attack on Pearl Harbor (on December 7, 1941) triggered the 
U.S. entry into the Second World War and a shift in focus among the dam builders from water 
to power. The official Reclamation history of the dam stated: “Outbreak of war emphasizes 
need for additional electric power generating facilities in northern California. Central Valley 
Project placed on war basis.”196 The outbreak of war also meant fewer resources for the salmon 
as supplies, such as building materials and trucks, became more tightly controlled.  
One of the signs of the change in focus was that on December 30, 1941, Charles E. Carey 
was assigned to occupy a new position in charge of the electric power part of the Central Valley 
Project. Carey had been working for the Bonneville Power Administration before he came to 
the Central Valley Project.197 Yet another sign of this shift was a press release published on 
January 8, 1942, entitled “Central Valley Project to add to America’s War effort,” which 
indicated that the project’s focus was shifting toward electricity generation instead of water 
supply.  
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1942 
The January 1942 Issue of Outdoor America ran an article by Hedgpeth called 
“California’s Forgotten Fish” in which he called for more focus on the salmon. Even though 
Hedgpeth was no longer working for the project, he still cared for the fish and worked to 
advocate for them. 
On January 14, 1942, Paul A. Shaw, who had written the report about copper pollution 
in the Sacramento River, wrote to Harper, the Chief Engineer at Reclamation, and explained 
what he had learned about the ownership of various mine tunnels which were leaking copper 
into the Sacramento River. Shaw had tracked down the owner of several abandoned mine 
tunnels and gotten permission to close the largest of these tunnels. Shaw felt that these 
tunnels would have major impact on aquatic life if not sealed.198 However when Harper replied, 
he indicated that he did not favor closing the tunnels. Instead he wrote, 
 “… the Bureau of Reclamation has not, as yet, determined to its satisfaction either the extent to 
which the tunnel sealing method of dealing with the problem to which you may present the 
most effective solution of that problem, or the extent to which that work, even if it should be 
concluded to be the most effective remedial measure, is an obligation which could or should be 
assumed by this Bureau.”199   
Harper most likely thought that sealing the tunnels would be expensive and also not very 
glamorous. Still, despite his claim that Reclamation was not obligated to do anything about the 
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tunnels, the pollution surely affected the salmon for which Reclamation had accepted some 
measure of responsibility.  
On Feb 19, 1942, a conference between Reclamation and USFWS held in Redding 
discussed “controlling factors” in handling the 1942 run of salmon. They outlined a plan for the 
salmon salvage that year. One part of this plan was that the Balls Ferry Rack would be ready 
two weeks before Shasta Dam cut off the river, at the time planned for August 1. Any fish that 
passed the rack before it was closed were thought to have enough time to get past the dam, 
and the fish that showed up later would be hauled in tank trucks to the McCloud River above 
the dam. This plan didn’t make provisions for the newly hatched fish to get downstream 
although earlier Needham had expressed concerns about this problem.200 It would later turn 
out that this timeline was incorrect for both the dam and the Balls Ferry Rack to the detriment 
of the salmon. 
On February 20, 1942, Gabrielson, the director of the USFWS, wrote Page to complain 
that Reclamation was not giving USFWS enough funding. He wrote that, “The allotment of 
$75,000 in lieu of the amount requested in our letter of November 29 must of necessity, involve 
a radical revision of the scheduled program.”201 Gabrielson also complained that many facilities 
would not be ready for the 1942 season. Neither the Coleman Hatchery nor the Balls Ferry Rack 
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and trap would be ready. Gabrielson requested $20,000 for ongoing biological investigations 
and $60,000 for the salvage efforts between then and June 30. As the director of a new agency, 
Gabrielson needed to defend his turf; he was more involved with the project than Bell had been 
as the Commissioner of Fisheries. 
On March 1, 1942, Hedgpeth published an article in the Oakland Tribune. It mainly 
concerned one of the canals near the American River, but also discussed the impact of the 
Central Valley Project on salmon generally. Hedgpeth continued to advocate for the 
environment with the public. He was articulating values beyond the agencies. His voice was 
loud enough that Reclamation would soon take notice. 
On March 25, 1942, four tank trucks were delivered to USFWS personnel working on the 
project with three more about 30 days later. These trucks were specially built and better than 
the trucks used the year before.202 1941 had been a test of concept that had worked well 
enough that special equipment was acquired. The trucks were quite important to the Shasta 
Salmon Salvage Plan as they would be used to haul fish trapped at Keswick or Balls Ferry to 
Deer Creek.  
On March 27, 1942, William L. Finley, Vice President of the Izaak Walton League, a major 
sports fishing group, made a speech opposing the Central Valley Project at the League’s 
twentieth annual meeting. . Finley made similar complaints to Hedgpeth, namely that the 
Central Valley Project was a waste of money and that it was impossible to build a canal through 
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the Delta.203 Surprisingly, his speech did not focus on the effects the CVP was having on the 
salmon. His complaints together with Hedgpeth’s greatly upset Reclamation engineers.  
Reclamation responded defensively to Hedgpeth and Finley’s statements. On April 3, 
1942, Calland wrote to Harper about Hedgpeth and Finley. He explained, “If widely circulated, 
this specious argument could succeed in killing the American River Diversion Plan, however 
meritorious, before it could be started.” Calland seemed quite upset. He recommended that a 
joint press release be issued by Reclamation and the USFWS dealing with Hedgpeth and Finley’s 
thoughts on salmon. He also recommended a separate burst of publicity in favor of the 
American River diversion.204 Calland seemed quite convinced of the merits of the American 
River project and unwilling to consider criticism. 
On April 9, 1942, Harper wrote to the Commissioner of Reclamation about the public 
relations problems caused by Finley and Hedgpeth. Harper wrote that surveys had found the 
Delta Cross Channel, a piece of the Central Valley Project needed to convey water through the 
Delta, to be possible, and that the American River Diversion plan was “only an idea.” He 
recommended publishing “true stories” to counteract the bad press. 205 
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Around this time, the Bureau of Reclamation became generally much more worried 
about publicity. As well as trying to directly counter activists like Hedgpeth, Reclamation 
launched a program called Central Valley Project Studies. This program launched on April 13, 
1942, produced classroom curricula which supported the project. Reclamation also called “for 
broad analysis of power, agricultural, industrial and other economic aspects of the project by 40 
federal, state and local agencies under sponsorship of the Bureau of Reclamation.” 206 There is 
no evidence that they actually sponsored any studies.  
On April 16, 1942, Page approved of a planned press release to counter Hedgpeth and 
Finley. He wanted the document to be “of a positive character, and if practical keyed to a spot 
occasion rather than as specifically for a denial of Mr. Finley’s assertions.”207 On May 13, 1942, 
Harper sent Page a copy of the proposed press release. The press release did not mention fish; 
instead, it refuted criticisms based on the engineering problems of building the Delta Cross 
Channel and the American River Diversion. 208 So even though the issues were brought up by 
people who were concerned about the fish, Reclamation did not address salmon-centered 
criticism of the Central Valley Project, instead preferring to focus on engineering details where 
they were on firmer ground. Thus Reclamation never really addressed the biological concerns. 
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On May 7, 1942, a new agreement between Reclamation and the USFWS went into 
effect. This gave the two agencies similar responsibilities as were in effect before, and 
Reclamation would provide $80,000 to fund USFWS activities.209 This was a continuation of 
funding levels, not a significant change. The fact that the funding for the Salvage project came 
from Reclamation’s budget presented a fundamental problem for the project, as Reclamation 
constantly saw this as USFWS taking money away from them. This funding arrangement also 
gave Reclamation far more control of the project that the trained biologist working for USFWS.  
The second week of March in 1942 was designated “California Conservation Week” by 
the California Conservation Council which invited Reclamation to participate. This event 
illustrates how the meaning of the word conservation has changed over time. Water 
conservation, in the literature provided by the California Conservation Council, was “for 
irrigation, power production, and other purposes…,” not for fish, or the environment.210 This is 
more of a progressive ideal of conservation: saving resources for human use. This type of 
conservation focused on management. Salmon were not mentioned in the program, though 
they were impacted by water use. This type of thinking was changing, but very slowly. 
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On May 23, 1942, the river was diverted into a spillway below the dam as part of the 
construction process for the Keswick Dam.211 At this time a fish ladder was constructed but 
quickly failed to function as intended. In late 1942 the War Production Board ordered a work 
stoppage at the dam but allowed work on the fish ladder to continue until it was completed on 
June 1, 1943. Thus fish were unable to cross the Keswick Dam site for nearly a year. This 
significantly harmed the sub-population that spawned that year.  
While construction in the Shasta Division moved forward, other parts of the Central 
Valley Project did not fare so well in wartime. In May, construction on the Contra Costa Canal 
was suspended for lack of war priority, with 38 miles out of 47 of the canal completed and in 
service.212 This reflects the wartime focus on power over irrigation. The war also affected 
efforts to save the salmon by redirecting attention elsewhere. 
In June 1942, Fred J Foster became the Director of Fisheries for the State of Washington, 
leaving the project. Gabrielson, the Director of USFWS, requested that Reclamation personnel 
correspond with Needham in the future.213 
On June 16, 1942, the initial concrete was poured at Friant Dam on the San Joaquin 
River.214 This received little notice from the people working to save the Shasta salmon even 
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though Friant was to have a huge impact on the species. In general the San Joaquin salmon run 
received very little attention from those concerned about the environment. However the 
Central Valley Project would have a substantial impact on the salmon of the San Joaquin as it 
would cause the river to run completely dry in many years. Without water in the river the San 
Joaquin salmon runs were in trouble as the fish could not swim upstream. This population is the 
furthest south of any Chinook run, and is especially adapted for warmer temperatures. It was 
not until the 1950s that the fate of the river became apparent.215 
On June 23, 1942, war agencies demanded the tank trucks for transporting salmon be 
given to the war effort. These trucks were critical for the salvage plan. Salmon traveling 
upstream were supposed to be trapped and taken either to Deer Creek or to the hatchery; if 
stranded below the dam many salmon would fail to reproduce, some battering themselves 
against Keswick Dam.216 
To replace the confiscated trucks, Reclamation bought seven used trucks. However the 
tanks needed to be refitted to the new trucks and the trucks themselves refurbished–all of 
which took time and created a delay in transporting the salmon. It was not until August that the 
new trucks were even purchased and those trucks would not be ready for several months. In 
December of 1942 the work upgrading the refurbished trucks was completed and the trucks 
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were ready to ship to Shasta.217 This was after the main salmon runs of the year so the trucks 
were not useful in transporting the 1942 runs. Thus during the 1942 season no salmon were 
hauled; this omission was a major setback for the hauling program.218 Since it is unclear if the 
hauling program ever had major impact on the fish, the salmon population may not have been 
affected. 
Meanwhile, the construction of the dam was behind schedule. Reclamation telegraphed 
Needham asking him for salmon salvage scenarios involving closing the river to fish at a date 
later than the then planned October 1st, which was already several months later than had been 
planned for at the beginning of the year. Needham replied that if the dam could be kept open 
for three months longer–until December 31, then the expense of salvaging the fall run of 
salmon would mostly be spared. He also said that relatively few salmon migrate in December so 
a closure date of Nov. 30 would have a similar impact on the fish to Dec. 31. Needham goes on 
to say that he does not think that young salmon migrating downstream in the summer of 1943 
will have much problem getting over the dam which would still be under construction and 
lower than its final height. Needham next noted that he thought March 31, which would be six 
months after the planned October 1 closing, would be the ideal date as far as salmon were 
concerned. This would give everyone time to finish the infrastructure for the salmon, such as 
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fish traps and the Coleman Hatchery. Due to the war there was a shortage of material and labor 
for these structures.219 Needham’s answer here was based on only biological considerations, 
but due to the war, these types of considerations would be given low priorities giving 
Needham’s advice even less weight with Reclamation personnel.  
The situation with materials was such that Harper wrote that Reclamation would be 
able to supply only one of the three promised racks. He added, “Although the Fish and Wildlife 
Service has been notified that it would be expected to install the racks, this was on the 
assumption that all construction would be completed.” Since bids for the Balls Ferry Rack had 
been received on August 15220, it was, by default, the rack to build.  
Assistant Director of USFWS Jackson was concerned about all the delays in the Salmon 
Salvage Project. He expressed this in a letter to Page. Jackson requested that the closure of 
Shasta Dam, which was planned for Oct. 1, be delayed until March 31 as per Needham’s 
preferred scenario. While Jackson acknowledged that the delays in constructing the salmon 
infrastructure were “unavoidable war conditions,” he believed that if the river were blocked on 
Oct. 1, then the whole once-every-four-years cycle of fish could be lost or seriously impaired. To 
successfully salvage the fish with an October 1 closure, trapping would have to begin on 
September 24, using a temporary trap which he did not think would be ready in time. Jackson 
went on to say that, “In the event the demands of power production will not permit the 
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delaying of the closure … The Fish and Wildlife Service obviously cannot assume the 
responsibility for the permanent destruction of an important element in the nation’s food 
resources.”221 Note that Jackson is discussing the food value of salmon here; the importance of 
salmon as food was heightened due to the war.  
On September 12 Harper wrote to Page about when to close the dam. Harper thought 
that closure would not be possible until March 31, 1943, due to “the flood season.” This 
supported Needham and Jackson. He recommended that no changes be made to the plan.222 
About a week later on September 18, 1942, Page sent a teletype to Construction 
Engineer Lowry requesting information on the salmon salvage project, including current actions 
and likelihood of completing the infrastructure. 223 Possibly he needed this information to make 
a decision about when to block the river. Lowry replied the next day saying that about 100 
salmon a day were currently passing the dam. Construction of the Balls Ferry trap had been 
started but the rack part of the structure was delayed. Construction of the middle rack was 
underway and Lowry thought it could be completed by October 20. He also thought the dam 
might be closed as early as October 15. The existing trap structure at Anderson Cottonwood 
Dam was adequate for handling 400 fish per day. Lowry implied that things were well under 
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control and that the temporary facilities were adequate for the job despite the fact that there 
were still no trucks to haul the fish caught in the traps. 224 
Page continued to be concerned about the salmon even after receiving Lowry’s reply. 
He sent another teletype expressing his concern. This read in part, “Believe care of run this fall 
may be in danger. Best communications give no comprehensive story of condition and suggest 
possibility of bureau being placed in bad position between fish destruction or delay in power 
production....This situation serious and seems to require aggressive attention."225 He sent 
another teletype a few days later suggesting that more temporary structures might be needed. 
He ended with “detailed program needed badly.”226 It is unclear what motivated Page’s 
concern, but he seemed more worried about the salmon than anyone else at Reclamation. 
The Middle Sacramento Rack began operation October 10, 1942. It was known as the 
middle rack because it was the middle of three planned racks, with the upper rack upstream 
and the Balls Ferry Rack downstream. This rack was supposed to help keep the fish spread out 
                                                          
224 Lowry to Page, telegram, September 19, 1942, Box 126 file fish conservation March 1942 to 
Oct 1942, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY10 Department of 
the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–Rocky Mountain Region 
(Denver). 
225 Page, to Lowry, teletype, September 25, 1942, Box 126 file fish conservation March 1942 to 
Oct 1942, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY10 Department of 
the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–Rocky Mountain Region 
(Denver). 
226 Page, to Lowry, teletype, September 28, 1942, Box 126 file fish conservation November 1942 
to August 1944, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY10 
Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–Rocky 
Mountain Region (Denver). 
104 
 
so they would use more of the river below the dam to spawn in.227 The source of the money 
and materials to build this rack is unclear.  
On November 7, 1942, Lowry telegraphed Page and Bashore saying, “Hundreds of fish 
spawning in section of river adjacent to Redding. Needham and Holmes of Fish and Wildlife 
Service here and appear entirely satisfied with present conditions.”228 Thus despite the 
setbacks in building the racks and acquiring trucks, the project was succeeding in the eyes of at 
least one biologist. 
Finally, on Nov 8, 1942, Shasta Dam became an impassable barrier to salmon migrating 
upstream.229 This was later than the October 1 that Reclamation had discussed but much earlier 
than Needham’s ideal date of March 1943 and somewhat earlier than Needham’s earliest date 
to block the river, November 30. This meant that the runs that year were unable to travel above 
the dam to spawn and had a much lower reproductive success than they would have if the river 
had been blocked later. A few days later on November 13, 1942, Lowry wrote to Needham, 
saying, that “a considerable number of salmon have accumulated just downstream from 
Keswick Dam” and that if Needham wanted to haul the fish somewhere else, his office was 
                                                          
227 Lowry to Page, telegram, November 7, 1942, Box 126 file fish conservation November 1942 
to August 1944, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 131, FY10 
Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–Rocky 
Mountain Region (Denver).  
228 Lowry to Page and Bashore, telegram, November 7, 1942, Box 126 file fish conservation 
November 1942 to August 1944, Project correspondence File 1930-1945 Central Valley 107.2 
131, FY10 Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–
Rocky Mountain Region (Denver). 
229 Needham, Hanson, and Parker, Supplementary Report,5. 
105 
 
willing to help move the fish.230 There is no record of Needham’s response. Meanwhile, the 
newly completed middle rack did not operate smoothly. It was never fish tight, and storms in 
November brought down debris from the dam construction which washed out the rack. 231 Thus 
the rack was functional for only one season, and even then it worked poorly. The upper rack 
was never constructed.  
In November and December of 1942, Fish and Wildlife personnel observed the fall-run 
salmon in the Sacramento River below Keswick both by boat and on foot. They found salmon 
spawning in all of the gravel that had been identified as suitable. The crew also recovered 499 
dead salmon which they cut open to see how completely the fish had spawned and found that 
most these were “spawned out.” Based on these observations, Needham concluded that the 
salmon had spawned successfully. 232 
December 2, 1942, marked the official launching of the Central Valley Project Studies. A 
wide variety of studies were to be conducted under this umbrella by government agencies as 
well as academic institutions. The theory was that this would help meet the needs of the war 
effort and the planned post-war expansion. However, of 24 problems to be studied related to 
the Central Valley Project, which were listed in a press release, not one was about salmon. 
Instead the problems focused on exploiting the water to the fullest primarily through irrigation 
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and electric power. The questions were also very focused on financial issues such as funding for 
the project and prices for water and power. 233 
However, the scientists working on the project were still focused on salvaging the 
salmon. On December 28, 1942, Bashore wrote a letter to Harper outlining what he expected 
from the project in the next year. His summary included 6,000 spring run fish being hauled to 
Deer Creek and the rest of the run being taken to Battle Creek, the site of Coleman Hatchery. 
He also requested more information including a count of fish migrating upstream and their 
distribution in time, the number of fish to be hauled to Battle Creek, and verification of other 
aspects of the plan. 234 Bashore’s letter was in keeping with the overall plan as outlined by the 
Board of Consultants. 
1943 
In early 1943 the Fish and Wildlife personnel decided not to install the upper rack that 
year because the site selected had many flaws and the previous season had gone well even 
without the rack. 235 Also at this time, winter flooding had damaged the Balls Ferry Rack, and its 
fish trap was no longer working.236 Since the middle rack had been washed out by storms, this 
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meant that the Balls Ferry Rack was the only rack in operation. The plan to use three racks to 
spread out the spawning fish was not being effectively executed. This part of the plan was 
supposed to preserve the wild spawning fish, but this aspect of the overall plan was continually 
neglected.  
On February 5, 1943, Joseph Kemmerich of the Portland office of the USFWS wrote to 
Laythe an engineer working for USFWS expressing concerns about the Shasta Salvage Program. 
At this point neither fish trap was operating. Kemmerich worried this could cause problems. He 
wrote: 
“If the fish passed upstream beyond Keswick Dam, we believe that the problem of salvaging 
those fish at or near the base of Shasta Dam would be so great that rather than attempt to 
accomplish this, it would be less difficult to place the Balls Ferry trap into operation, regardless 
of the amount of work involved in placing this structure in a satisfactory operating condition.” 
237  
With the racks not working properly and both fish traps not working, there was a danger that 
fish would reach the dam and destroy themselves. 
To address this, on February 17, 1943, Harper met with Higgins, Laythe and Needham to 
talk about the trapping problem. However, Keswick Dam would not be capable of stopping fish 
until “the raising of the spillway crest could be completed.”238 Even if repaired, the Balls Ferry 
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Trap could not be operated when flows were above 15,000 cubic feet per second. Thus it 
seemed likely that many of the spring-run fish would not be caught.  
By March three of the improvised trucks had been refurbished and were ready for 
service, and a fourth was almost ready. 239 However, in May the Office of Defense 
Transportation released the original trucks back to the project.240 This meant the 1943 season 
would have full access to trucks and that the trapping and hauling could proceed.  
There were still concerns about implementing the project so that the salmon could 
behave naturally and still be salvaged. On May 3, 1943, Gabrielson wrote to Page defending the 
natural spawning portion of the project. He stated that biologically he still believed in the three 
rack plan but that it would not work because the racks could not be made fish tight. At the time 
of the letter, neither the middle nor the upper rack was in place for the 1943 season. 
Gabrielson relates that the original plan for the racks was for each to have fixed aprons on 
which they would be installed. The aprons would be patches of concrete permanently set into 
the river that would provide a smooth surface to attach the racks to as well as helping to 
anchor them. He requested that Page consider redesigning the racks with fixed aprons or some 
other way to make them fish tight for the 1944 season.241  
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Properly building the racks would be delayed because of financial concerns. Later that 
month (May 20, 1943) McConaughy sent a memo to Harper discussing the cost of the salmon 
project. Reclamation had already spent $1,518,000 constructing the Keswick trap and other 
features of the salvage project. McConaughy contended that the annual cost of operating the 
project (including interests on capital costs) was much more than the commercial value of the 
salmon.242 
Based on McConaughy’s memo, Harper wrote to Page. Harper wanted USFWS to not 
only pay the costs going forward, but to reimburse Reclamation for capital costs. He went on to 
argue that the permanent aprons for the racks would be too expensive (estimated about 
$100,000 each) and that anyway they couldn’t get materials for them in time to build for the 
1944 season. He suggested that, “…if this season’s experience indicated that a change was 
necessary, the Bureau would be open to suggestions…” However, the racks were never 
rebuilt.243 
By early summer of 1943, the Coleman Hatchery was ready for operation. The hatchery 
used a series of racks in Battle Creek to hold the fish before they spawned.244 It was a key part 
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of the plan. Reclamation engineers and some biologist believed that the hatchery could result 
in more fish than would spawn without human intervention, thus replacing the lost habitat 
above the dam. Contemporary people who put great faith in technology frequently seemed to 
view it as superior to nature. For example Young, believed that his work as a Reclamation 
engineer was of great benefit to humanity. Even Needham, who was skeptical of hatcheries 
proposed plans that involved extensive engineering work, like the Stillwater plan.   
Finally on June 1, 1943, the Keswick trap was completed and the trucks put into service. 
By this time much of the spring run had passed and many salmon had been stuck below the 
Keswick Dam for a long time. Some had so battered themselves against the dam that they died 
before the transfers began.245 In a later report Moffat wrote of the start of the program that 
“…many facilities were not completed and it was necessary to make improvisations and 
adaptations of inadequate equipment which at times threatened the very operation of the 
undertaking.”246 Still USFWS continued their efforts. 
Between June 1 and June 25, 5,245 Chinook salmon were transferred from the main 
stream of the Sacramento to Deer Creek. This project was much better equipped than the 
previous transfer. When the trucks reached the dump site “…the tank water was slowly 
tempered by pumping water from the creek into the truck tank. The fish were released when 
the water temperature in the tank was within two or three degrees of that in the creek.”247 This 
protected the salmon from being shocked by a sudden change in temperature. Still, even with 
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this improvement, the salmon mortality rate was high and 24.4 percent of the fish transferred 
died. This was only about five percent less than the mortality in 1941. Even the best available 
equipment was far from ideal. Still, some of the extra mortality was because the fish were 
damaged from being held below the dam for so long.  
On June 1, 1943, Gabrielson sent Page an estimated budget for Fiscal Year 44 (the Fiscal 
Year ending in 1944). He estimated the cost of “biological control salmon salvage, Shasta dam” 
at $24,320 and the total cost of all fish related work on the Central Valley Project at 
$40,280.20.248 Though in previous years the USFWS had to fight for their budget, this year it 
was allocated without much fuss, though it is unclear why. The agreement between USFWS and 
Reclamation for Fiscal Year 1944 gave Fish and Wildlife $120,000, which for once was more 
than they asked for.249 This included both the work at Shasta and the Trinity River project. 
On June 15, 1943, Bashore wrote a letter to Gabrielson about making the racks fish 
tight. “All costs incurred by the project must eventually be repaid by the water users and other 
project beneficiaries and it is the policy of the Bureau of Reclamation to scrutinize all proposed 
expenditures carefully. Evidence now available does not furnish sufficient justification for 
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additional construction.”250 So Bashore used monetary reasons to refuse to build aprons for the 
racks and stated that the needs of large farmers (the water users) were more important than 
the needs of the salmon.  
Yet interest in salvaging salmon remained. On June 30 special scientific report No. 26 
“Supplementary Report on Investigations of Fish-Salvage Problems in Relation to Shasta Dam” 
was published. This report was authored by Needham, Hanson and Lewis P. Parker. Despite the 
fact that the Sacramento Natural Spawning Plan had by this point mostly failed to have been 
implemented and that the fish transport was not going especially well (the equipment wasn’t 
always there, and many fish died in transit even with the state-of-the-art trucks in operation) 
the report was not nearly as pessimistic as the original 1940 report. The report discussed the 
middle and upper racks in the Sacramento River as though the setbacks were temporary and 
the racks would eventually be installed even though this turned out not to be the case.251 
Perhaps their optimism was based on unfulfilled expectations.  
In July, 24% of the salmon transferred from below Keswick Dam to Deer Creek died—
mostly from “severe injuries sustained by jumping against the rocks at the base of Keswick 
Dam”252 This especially high mortality and damage to the fish was caused by the delay in 
starting the transfer program. A sizeable number also died in the transfer tanks, which was 
blamed partly on “trash fish” getting into the tank with the salmon and depleting the oxygen.  
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On May 3, 1943, Harry W. Bashore was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Reclamation replacing Page. Bashore was a career Reclamation engineer who had worked on 
the North Platte project as well as many West Coast projects.253 He had been acting 
commissioner for a few months before. Bashore was less fond of the Shasta Salmon Salvage 
project than Page was. Harper continued on as Chief Engineer. On July 6, 1943, Harper wrote to 
Bashore “… you express the view that the building up of the Sacramento River run is not a 
proper function of the Bureau and should not be financed by it. I concur.”254 Both men opposed 
using Reclamation funds to restore the salmon run to pre-1938 levels. This meant the top 
officials of Reclamation were now even more hostile to the project. Page had expressed at least 
some sympathy for the plight of the salmon.  
On September 20 the Balls Ferry Rack was installed for the year. The rack was also used 
as a counting station to keep track of how many fish reached that far up river each year. The 
rack was left in place until December 17th.255 On September 29, 1943, Jackson sent an estimate 
of costs for 1945 to Bashore. This included the Coleman Hatchery as a separate estimate from 
the Shasta Salmon Salvage Program. The former was estimated to cost $99,916.40 and the 
latter $23,311.39 for a total of $123,227.79.256 At this point the hatchery was much more 
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expensive than the racks and fish hauling but also much less questioned. However, the hatchery 
was not without problems, such as disease and failure to produce salmon with skills to thrive in 
the wild. In the 1930’s scientists including Needham had questioned the efficiency of 
hatcheries.257 Needham had even challenged Foster on this point in planning the Shasta Salvage 
effort. But once the plan was finalized no one suggested that Coleman Hatchery might be a bad 
idea.  
In fact scientists had been questioning the usefulness of hatcheries since the early 
1900’s. Due to experiments that showed that hatcheries didn’t work, all hatcheries in Canada 
and Alaska were shut down by 1936. However no other US state shut down hatcheries 258 
Taylor argues that the failure was due to structural problems, but Lichatowich sees the problem 
as ideological.259  
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CHAPTER 4. ACTIVISTS AND FINAL REPORTS 
 
Telegram campaign 
Mid December 1943 saw one of the more dramatic periods of the Shasta Salmon 
Project. Ordinary people expressed their concern about the salmon to government officials and 
were listened to. This was an early example of environmental activism and showed that people 
articulating their values could bring about at least limited change.  
It started quietly on December 13, 1943, when Lowry wrote to Needham to explain his 
plan to start storing water behind Shasta Dam on January 1, 1944. This plan would involve 
reducing the flow of the Sacramento River over the dam to only 500 CFS between January 1 and 
April 1, 1944.260 Such an action could have a large impact on the salmon eggs that were 
maturing below the dam. Lowry wrote a similar letter to the California Department of Fish and 
Game.261 
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Miller, then the head of California Department of Fish and Game, responded 
immediately. He sent a long telegram to Ickes, the Sectary of the Interior, complaining about 
the unilateral action of Reclamation, explaining that such a plan would endanger salmon eggs–
because they would likely dry out. He ended by writing, “respectfully request reopening of this 
whole subject before positive order is issued that you may weigh all factors before accepting 
responsibility for an irreplaceable loss of one of our natural resources.”262 Miller also wrote a 
longer letter the same day saying much the same thing.263 
A few days later on December 21, there was a flurry of commentary between 
Reclamation and USFWS. First Carey suggested to Bashore that they should obtain an order 
from the War Production Board directing the impounding of water according to their present 
schedule.264 Meanwhile, Jackson and Needham also complained to Bashore and recommended 
that 4,000 CFS be released in the month of January.265 
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On December 23, 1943, Bashore replied to Miller saying, “Am obtaining report from 
field and discussing matter with Fish and Wildlife Service. Will advise you when have 
determined most suitable operation plan to fit all conditions.”266 He also telegraphed Lowry 
and Carey “do not reduce flow as contemplated until action approved by this office.”267 Thus he 
agreed to consider doing as the biologists asked rather than agreeing with his own engineering 
staff. However, Carey had already moved forward with the original plan and sent notices to 
water users of the intended reduction in the Sacramento River flow.268 
The next day, December 24, Reclamation put out a press release about the start of the 
water storage at Shasta Dam that explained the original plan emphasizing the importance of 
the stored water to the war effort. 269 That day Harold L. Ickes received telegrams from The San 
Francisco Tyee club, a sports fishing club, which read in part, “The San Francisco Tyee Club the 
largest salmon fishing club on the pacific coast organized for the sole purpose of propagation 
and conservation of salmon protest reclamations proposal to reduce the flow from Shasta 
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reservoir…” 270 Robert Lorentz of the Tyee Club later wrote that his organization had been 
contacted by Needham about the issue, and it seems that Needham had a close relationship 
with this group.271 It is likely that Needham contacted other groups as well. Ickes also received 
another telegram from A. Paldini Inc., a commercial fishing company, which read “…such an 
action will result in the loss of salmon spawn in the river we wish to call your attention to the 
seriousness of this action which will destroy a large percentage of the salmon population in the 
river …”272 These telegrams were the first of many, as concern for the salmon spread. 
Both Carey and Lowry telegraphed Bashore protesting any change to their plan such as 
greater flow releases. They argued that it would be a dry year and that if not enough water was 
stored during the wet season, power production might be reduced.273 Power supply had been 
contracted to PG&E, and Carey and Lowry wanted to make sure they met that obligation. 
Additionally the power was being used for war industries. 
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Although the next day was Christmas, Dr. Robert Lorentz, president of the San Francisco 
Tyee Club, wrote a long letter to Ickes detailing the protest. He cited the extinction of the 
passenger pigeon and the commercial extinction of the Atlantic salmon as reasons for caution. 
Here he invoked a romantic image of America’s past. This type of image would become 
common in the environmental movement which was influenced by earlier Romantic ideas 
about nature. He also argued that there was not a power shortage.274 
Ickes continued to receive telegrams protesting Reclamation’s plan. On December 26, 
1943, he got one from the Associated Sportsmen of California which expressed concern about 
the salmon stating, “…this reduction would result in the irreparable loss of one of the remaining 
cycles of salmon.” The telegram asked for the flow to be maintained at 4000 second feet until 
the fish reached maturity. 275 The next day he received a similar telegram from PPC Famine 
[sic], presumably a fishing company. As well as requesting a continued flow of at least 4000 CFS 
the company as said, “… no doubt you are familiar with the salmon propagation and the salmon 
salvage program being conducted on the Sacramento River which will also be seriously 
threatened by this action at a time when the commercial fisheries of California are putting forth 
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every effort to produce as much fish for food as possible…”276 The protestors argued the merits 
of both extrinsic and intrinsic values of salmon.  
Bashore continued to work on the issues raised by the telegram campaign. On 
December 27, 1943, he requested Lowry to air mail the daily flows of the Sacramento River for 
December 1943.277 Presumably this was to get a sense of the numbers as both sides were 
making somewhat contrary claims about how much water was available.  
December 28 saw a major influx of telegrams and letters protesting the reduced flow 
out of concern for the salmon. Ickes received telegrams from the Livermore Pleasanton 
Sportsman club, “to save the salmon will not seriously effect power output,”278 San Francisco 
Local Fisherman’s and Allied Workers of America279, as well as letters from the Meredith Fish 
Company,280 and the Santa Cruz Rod and Gun Club.281 Meanwhile Leroy Johnson, U.S. 
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Representative from California, received two telegrams from farmers protesting the reduced 
river flow. 
Young weighed in that day as well. He noted that in 1941 the USFWS had suggested that 
3,000 CFS between Oct 20 and Jan 15, followed by 1000 CFS until April 15 would be adequate 
for the fish. Young thought that if this schedule of releases was followed, the dam would still be 
able to generate an adequate power but was firmly against releasing more water than 
suggested in 1941. He wrote, “Recommend that in any event we not make any compromise 
more liberal than the 1941 schedule.” Young cited concerns about low rainfall and not being 
able to meet quotas for the War Production Board. But he also seemed to feel that the fish 
were unimportant and called releasing water for them a “compromise” 282 
That same day Bashore telegraphed A. Paldini Inc. informing them that Reclamation 
would release 4000 second feet while they worked out the best plan.283 Bashore decided to 
release more water than originally planned and more water than Young recommended due to 
the protests. Although Bashore had decided to release water for the fish, he had no easy way to 
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tell concerned groups about this decision. Therefore telegrams advocating for the salmon 
continued to be sent to Ickes. On December 29 Ickes’ office received at least sixteen telegrams. 
These were primarily from sports fishing organizations but also from concerned legislators, 
fishing companies, the Redding Chamber of Commerce, and labor groups. In one telegram, Emil 
J. N. Ott, Jr., the president of the Mt. Ralston Fish Planting Club, wrote, “…imperative that a 
4000 second feet [CFS] of flow be maintained until February 1 or will lose our fall 1943 salmon 
run thereby losing one of our 4 cycles of salmon runs and seriously impairing the future salmon 
runs in California.”284 Thomas Doyle, a member of the California legislature, wrote, “salmon 
fishery important natural resource in California and should not be jeopardized without due 
consideration.”285 A wide variety of groups were concerned about the well-being of the fish.  
There were several common themes in the many telegrams sent. One was the fate of 
the passenger pigeon and the buffalo suggesting a wider environmental awareness and an 
intrinsic valuation of salmon. Many of the telegrams also mentioned the scientific basis for the 
protest. For example many knew that 4000 cubic feet of water per second (sometimes referred 
to as second feet) was the amount of water a biologist had recommended. The four-year cycle 
of the salmon spawning was also mentioned frequently. This suggests that these protesters 
were contacted by someone in the know like Needham. There is no clear evidence showing 
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how the telegram campaign was organized. But given some of the recurrent phrases in the 
telegrams and the fact that Needham helped mobilize the Tyee club, it is likely that he 
contacted other groups as well. This suggests Needham had a deep commitment to the salmon 
that went beyond their commercial value.  
Meanwhile, Miller wrote a telegram raising further concerns including the possibility 
that reduced flow could increase copper in the water and prove fatal to the fish.286 He also 
seems not to have  known that Bashore had decided to release more water. Communication 
between agencies was generally ineffective–especially between state and federal agencies.  
On December 29, 1943, Bashore telegraphed several concerned groups including the 
San Francisco Tyee club, “matter under discussion with war production board and fish and 
Wildlife Service. Water well be stored only above 4000 second feet [CFS] discharge at Shasta 
until have determined most suitable operating plan to fit all conditions”.287 He also sent a copy 
of this message to Lowry and Carey. Carey replied “suggest you revise telegram to those listed 
to read in effect that water will be stored about 4000 second feet [CFS] natural flow at Shasta 
etc. Storage once caught would not be released to maintain the 4000 second feet estimate 
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present natural flow about 300 [CFS].” 288 He seems to have accepted Bashore’s decision but 
wanted to keep water for power if it was already stored.  
December 30 saw still more telegrams for Ickes supporting water for the salmon. He 
received 11 including one from a San José sportswomen’s club, another one from the San 
Francisco Tyee club, and four from private individuals. 
On December 30, 1943, Bashore finalized the revised operating procedures for storing 
water behind Shasta Dam. He wired this new plan to Carey, Lowry and Young asking for 
comments. He took into account the biologists’ views much more than the engineers’ views 
despite the fact that he was an engineer. Under the new plan 4000 second feet would be 
released during January and stored water would be used to make sure that the minimum 
necessary was released. Starting in February releases would be restricted until April when the 
water was needed for irrigation.289 The telegram campaign had achieved its goal and enough 
water for salmon eggs was released.  
The Secretary of the Interior’s office continued to receive telegrams on December 31, 
totaling nine from a similar variety of groups as on previous days. Lowry, Carey and Young were 
not entirely pleased with the revised plan. Lowry wired that he had already reduced the flow of 
the Sacramento River to 3300 second feet and that he believed that the flow could be reduced 
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to 2500 without harming the fish. 290 It is unclear where he got those numbers, but it seems 
unlikely that they had any biological basis. Carey wrote that a predetermined plan was unlikely 
to work and that the water might be needed in the dry season for the war effort. He said that 
his office had “all the relevant facts” and requested Bashore “delegate full authority on this 
office to handle whole situation.” 291 Young wrote that with the planned release schedule the 
reservoir would not be full enough to generate power until the end of March assuming a 1931 
(a year of low rainfall) rainfall pattern. He finished by recommending that Reclamation “hold 
out for absolute minimum release possible.”292 Bashore was not getting much support for 
reducing storage at Shasta to help the fish from within Reclamation. The engineers were 
focused on other goals. 
On December 31, 1943, Bashore wrote to B. J. Sickler, the Director of the Power Division 
for the War Production Board, explaining the situation. He cited the large number of telegrams 
received from salmon supporters as impacting his decision making. He also wrote that 
Reclamation had spent a lot of money on protecting the salmon industry, and they had to think 
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about the four year cycle in the future.293 This shows the impact of the campaign. Bashore was 
working on changing the operation of the dam because of the telegrams.  
On January 4, 1944, Bashore telegraphed Carey granting him authority to handle the 
situation along the lines of the outline of December 30 which required water be released for 
fish. This was less than the full control that Carey wanted. Bashore also wrote “we should 
recognize that water should be stored as rapidly as possible and releases regulated to provide 
maximum power production but we must prevent damage to agricultural, fish and vital war 
industries.” He had trouble balancing all of these competing needs but nonetheless was trying 
hard.294On that same day Bashore sent a form letter with the revised salmon-friendly plan to 
everyone who had sent telegrams including Miller. This was the same plan that was sent to 
Carey, Lowry and Young. 295 More of these letters were sent on the eighth.296 
                                                          
293 Bashore to B. J. Sickler, December 31, 1943, Box 164 Entry 7 File 301.1 central valley Dams 
and reservoirs Shasta Dam Dec 1943, Project Correspondence File 1930-1945 central valley 
301.1, FY12, Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–
Rocky Mountain Region (Denver). 
294 Bashore to Carey, telegram, January 4, 1944, Box 164 Entry 7 File 301.1 central valley Dams 
and reservoirs Shasta Dam Jan. 1944 to June 1944, Project Correspondence File 1930-1945 
central valley 301.1, FY12, Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
RG 115, NARA–Rocky Mountain Region (Denver). 
295 Bashore to Miller, January 4, 1944, (5/17 176), Bashore “identical letters to:” (181-182), Box 
164 Entry 7 File 301.1 central valley Dams and reservoirs Shasta Dam Jan. 1944 to June 1944, 
Project Correspondence File 1930-1945 central valley 301.1, FY12, Department of the Interior, 
Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–Rocky Mountain Region (Denver). 
296 Bashore to Leroy Johnson, January 8, 1944; Bashore to A. Paldini, Inc., January 8, 1944; 
Bashore, list, January 8, 1944, Box 164 Entry 7 File 301.1 central valley Dams and reservoirs 
Shasta Dam Jan. 1944 to June 1944, Project Correspondence File 1930-1945 central valley 
301.1, FY12, Department of the Interior, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, RG 115, NARA–
Rocky Mountain Region (Denver). 
127 
 
Also on January 4, 1944, Bashore began receiving daily reports of the Shasta water 
level.297 He was keeping a close eye on the project which was important since he did not see 
eye to eye with the people operating Shasta. This meant that he would know and could 
intervene if necessary if not enough water was released although it does not seem to have 
come to that. The daily updates also let Bashore keep an eye on how fast Lake Shasta was filling 
up. 
The telegram campaign showed how important public option could be in shaping 
Reclamation policy. Dozens of telegrams were sent from a variety of different organizations, 
including sports fishing clubs, commercial fishing companies, unions, politicians, and 
individuals. This outpouring of support came from the broader community not agency officials. 
The telegrams expressed a variety of ways of valuing the salmon.   
Early 1944 
On February 19, 1944, The Sacramento Bee published an article called “Saving of Salmon 
Was Problem of Dam Builders,” which stated that “one of the problems arising from the 
construction of the Shasta Dam and now believed solved is the care of salmon which normally 
spawn above the 602 foot structure.”298 The article mentioned the Coleman Hatchery and the 
fish hauling program but not the racks across the river. At this time many people seemed to 
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think that the problem was solved and salmon began receiving less attention by biologists and 
the public. 
In February of 1944 water storage behind Shasta Dam to create the current Lake Shasta 
began. A major part of the Central Valley Project was now complete, though the Central Valley 
Project itself would take six more years to finish; the remaining work included Friant Dam and 
several canals. 
As the war was coming to a close, on April 14, 1944, Ickes made a speech at the 
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco entitled “America’s Post-War Frontier” about 
development in the West after the end of the war. The speech was about how irrigation would 
help create an agrarian society and did not mention the salmon. 299 The image of the frontier 
continued to have power in the American imagination, as people continued to see the idea of 
the frontier as fundamentally American. This view was also tied to valuing land and water in 
terms of their value for humans. This was not the only that time the post-war West was called a 
frontier. 
On September 9, 1944, William E. Warne, the Regional Director of Reclamation in 
California, gave a speech as part of a ‘Shasta, Unlimited” radio broadcast. He said, "…our 
frontier still exists…” and “…only one thing [is needed] to transform them into places of beauty 
and fecundity, wealth and security. That thing is water.”300 This says a lot about how Warne 
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valued the natural world. The most important thing in this world view is human wellbeing, and 
other creatures are not valued. Warne typified the views of Reclamation personnel on this 
matter. 
1944 trapping season 
The 1944 trapping and hauling did not go completely smoothly. Things were going well 
until June 5 when the power to the traps at Keswick Dam was shut off. The Fish and Wildlife 
Service personnel had been catching about 40 fish a day before the power was cut. Without the 
trapping facilities, fish quickly began to pile up below Keswick Dam and many injured 
themselves trying to jump over the dam. Needham said that in previous years there were as 
many as 1,000 fish per day and estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,500 salmon waiting to be 
trapped and hauled away below the dam on June 14.301 This severely endangered not just those 
fish, but also the population as a whole. Needham objected quite strongly not only to the 
power cut off but to the way his personnel were not informed of this in advance and the way 
Reclamation ran the salvage program generally. Needham said that Reclamation had been 
uncooperative and was not following the plan laid out by the Board of Consultants.  
On June 27, 1944, Jackson sent a memo to Bashore stating that he had spoken with 
Needham and that for fiscal year 1946 Reclamation should seek funding for the project rather 
than USFWS though they were discussing transferring part of the equivalent Grand Coulee 
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project to the USFWS as well. 302 Reclamation continued to see caring for salmon as not part of 
their job and thus tried to move the funding to USFWS. However, it is unclear if the USFWS 
would have been able to get funding without help from Reclamation.  
The focus for Reclamation’s public relations was still on electricity. The official Bureau of 
Reclamation timeline for the Central Valley Project records that, “Shasta Dam Power Plant first 
delivers power for war industry” on July 14.303 At this point the dam was not fully completed 
but at least some of the power generation was. In 1942 two of Shasta’s generators had been 
transferred to the Grand Coulee Dam, which was able use them to produce power sooner.304 
This slowed down the start of power production at Shasta. Shasta’s first power output was 
therefore less than the full capacity of the dam.  
Still, the plight of the fish was not given much attention. On September 23, 1944, 
Needham wrote to Martin H. Blote, the Chief Water Master, who worked for Reclamation in 
Sacramento, about the water released from Shasta. It seems that despite the previous year’s 
outcry, Reclamation was still planning to release far less water than biologists believed 
necessary for successful spawning. Needham wrote, “…1,000 cubic feet per second as minimum 
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release during spawning is far too low. Extremely serious harm would result to fish life if flows 
are reduced to this amount during the fall spawning, incubation and migration periods.”305 
Later, on October 7, 1944, Senator Downey held a meeting in Fresno to discuss water 
for fish and wildlife. Downey had run on a somewhat populist platform. However, he would 
later argue against laws requiring land owners served by the Central Valley Project to own only 
160 acres. Downey did not invite representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation to attend the 
meeting. Instead, the meeting was attended by sportsmen and local landowners. At the 
meeting Downey pledged to support legislation that would guarantee water for wetlands used 
by migrating birds in the San Joaquin Valley. Salmon were not mentioned at the meeting; this 
omission is an example of the fragmented nature of conservation movements related to the 
Central Valley Project.306 
In the next important conversation, on Oct 21 McConaughy arrived in Sacramento 
having left Denver two days before. In Sacramento he met with Carey, Calland and McGuiness 
at the Reclamation regional office. Then McConaughy, McGuiness, Gardern, Personen, and 
Merrian drove to Redding. They spent October 22, 23 and part of 24 “in an inspection of 
existing work for migratory fish control and discussion of the various changes and which the 
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Fish and Wildlife Service requested.…”307 They were joined by Needham, Hansen and Pelnar for 
Fish and Wildlife as well as Lowry.  
McConaughy reported that USFWS had revised upward the number of fish that Deer 
Creek could support from 9,000 to 12,000. Therefore they intended to transfer more salmon to 
Deer Creek. They also wanted to dump the fish in the creek father upstream requiring four 
miles of additional road. This was so the fish could be placed above the diversion used for 
agriculture. McConaughy suggested dumping the fish in an irrigation canal instead, less than an 
ideal habitat. Fortunately, McConaughy’s suggestion was not acted upon.  
USFWS members also reported that they were having trouble keeping the spring run 
salmon in Battle Creek, the site of Coleman Hatchery. The biologists wanted to transfer these 
fish to Deer Creek instead and pump water from the Sacramento for the fish. McConaughy did 
not find the arguments of USFWS personnel in favor of this expensive operation convincing and 
instead thought existing facilities should be used. McConaughy does not explain how this 
approach would work. At the time of McConaughy’s visit Coleman was not being used to its full 
capacity.  
McConaughy also discussed the concrete aprons needed to make the fish racks fish 
tight. However, he thought that the makeshift measures that USFWS were using to make the 
racks fish tight, such as dumping gravel along the bottoms, were sufficient and that the cost of 
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concrete aprons would be too much to be worthwhile. The aprons were never poured, and the 
racks continued not to be fish tight reducing their effectiveness.  
Another important meeting occurred on October 26-27 when the Regional Water 
Master met with Needham and Moffett to discuss the problem of water releases from Shasta 
during spawning season. “As a result of these investigations, it was mutually agreed that on 
November 1 the releases would be increased from 2,500 c.f.s. to 3,000 c.f.s. This flow to be 
maintained through the spawning season and not decreased until December 15 at which time 
the flow would be again reduced to 2,500 c.f.s.”308 Thus Needham and Moffett were able to 
protect the spawning fish with much less effort than the previous year. It is likely that the 1943 
telegram campaign helped give them leverage to achieve this result.  
On November 9, 1944, the Balls Ferry Rack was damaged by flooding. A storm came in 
so rapidly that there was not time to get a crew together to remove the rack. The storm surge 
carrying debris caused major damage to the rack even washing away some of the pilings.309 The 
Fish and Wildlife Service salvaged what they could of the rack, but only 10 sections of about 30 
were recovered in good condition. The flood was not anticipated because most of the upstream 
water was trapped by Shasta Dam; the flooding occurred due to a heavy rain fall in the Cow 
Creek watershed. In a letter dated Dec. 7, Lowry suggested that in light of the proposed Table 
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Mountain Dam, it was not worth properly fixing the fish rack.310 In a report detailing the 
incident, Pelnar, the district supervisor of USFWS, wrote the rack was necessary for the salmon 
salvage and that the rack should be replaced by September 9, 1945, at the very latest.311 This 
rack was the only one in operation of the three river racks planned and also acted as a fish trap.  
The Balls Ferry Rack was never replaced. This was the end of the rack-based plan which 
focused on river based spawning. The plan was doubtful from the beginning but was never 
really given a chance to work as the upper rack was never built, the middle rack operated for 
only one season, and the Balls Ferry Rack for only for two years. Even when the racks were in 
place, they were not fish tight, which made them less effective. 
1945 
On January 4, 1945, Calland wrote to Moffett that due to war conditions and the 
possibility of building the Table Mountain Dam, he didn’t intend to make more than minimal 
repairs of the washed out Balls Ferry Rack and asked Moffett what the minimum repairs 
needed for the 1945 season would be.312 
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On January 29, 1945, Gabrielson issued a policy change so that personnel from 
Reclamation were directed to contact the Portland Regional Office rather than Needham or 
Moffet. This was because the investigations led by Needham and later Moffet were now taking 
second place to the operation of the Coleman Hatchery which was seen as the center of the 
salvage program.313 The operators of Coleman were also less concerned about the river based 
spawning aspects of the plan. This most likely reduced the influence of any new science and 
concentrated the program on the hatchery rather than on wild Chinook. This meant that the 
effectiveness of the hatchery and its effects on the genetic makeup of the salmon population 
were not questioned.  
Between Nov 4 and 26, 1946, 7,536 fall run salmon were transferred to the Coleman 
Hatchery due to crowding at Keswick Dam. It is unclear why they were taken to the hatchery 
and not to Deer Creek but this shows the growing dominance of the hatchery. These salmon 
had much higher survival rates than previously, with only 2.8% of the females dying before 
spawning. The salmon fry these fish produced were held “until they had been feeding for some 
time.” They were all released into Battle Creek before April 15th.314 
The fate of the salmon hauling program 
Spring run salmon were hauled from below Keswick Dam, nine miles downstream of 
Shasta to Deer Creek about 60 miles away. They were first hauled in 1941; due to the war no 
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fish were transferred in 1942, but the hauling program resumed in 1943 and operated until 
1946. In total 15,802 fish were transferred but 18% either died in transit or soon after. Overall 
the program was not considered a success, not because of the high death rate of the fish, but 
because the condition of Deer Creek was poor. Too much water was diverted for irrigation 
making the water too warm and shallow. There were also several dams in the creek which the 
salmon had difficultly crossing, and many unscreened irrigation diversions which were a hazard 
to young salmon. 315 
After the completion of Shasta Dam 
In April 1949, Dr. James W. Moffett’s report on the first four years of the Salvage Project 
was published. The report is surprisingly optimistic about the fate of Sacramento River salmon 
given earlier reports, although it still points out potential problems. Moffett described the 
effect of construction thus: “The Sacramento River below Shasta Dam has undergone rather 
radical changes since the operation of Shasta Reservoir began. The most obvious of these 
changes are: (1) reduction in water temperature during summer and increase in water 
temperature in winter; (2) alteration of run-off patterns; and (3) removal of much silt from the 
water,” and noted that the dam cut off fifty percent of the spawning ground of the Sacramento 
River Chinook.316 These factors would suggest that Shasta had not been kind to the salmon. 
However he went on to say:  
                                                          
315 Fredrick K. Cramer and David F. Hammak, Salmon Research at Deer Creek California 
Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, 1952. 
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“The higher water temperature existing during November and December as a result of the 
stored heat in Shasta Reservoir has unquestionably accelerated the development of eggs and 
advanced the time of migration seaward. This change is a distinct advantage as far as the river 
life of the young salmon is concerned because it affords a greater time for migration before 
dangers from irrigation diversions mount.”317 
It is hard to imagine a present day ecologist writing so positively about the modification of a 
species’ lifecycle. They would more likely be gravely concerned about such a change. Moffett 
concludes his report by stating, “Present ecological conditions in the Sacramento River below 
Shasta Dam are greatly improved for natural production of salmonoid fishes.…The 
improvement in river conditions has compensated, as nearly as can be determined at present, 
for the loss of spawning ground above Shasta Dam.”318 This upbeat report is surprising after 
how pessimistic other scientists were about Shasta’s impact on the fish. This is especially true 
since ultimately Shasta Dam had a major negative impact on the salmon.  
The map printed with Moffet’s paper on the facilities used in the project includes all 
three river racks, even though by 1949 none of them were in operation, and the upper rack had 
never even been built.   
Moffet thought that transferring salmon to Deer Creek was unlikely to increase the 
salmon population in that stream unless more was done to improve the habitat.319 He wanted 
less water to be taken from the creek for irrigation, the stream to be channelized, and for 
obstructions to fish passage to be removed. Moffet’s optimism, however, was tempered. He 
wrote, “The possibility of materially reducing, if not entirely eliminating the salmon crop by 
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using water required for its maintenance for other purposes is not as remote as might be 
supposed.”320 
Moffet used more ecological language than other reports about the Chinook. He used 
the words ecology and ecological, and he discussed population dynamics. This suggests a shift 
in the way scientists were contextualizing the salmon. Moffet was more aware of the fish’s role 
as a piece of a whole system than earlier writers.  
It is now thought that the loss of habitat, changes in the river seasonal cycles and 
reduced flow all had an extremely negative impact on the Central Valley’s salmon runs. It is 
unclear if most contemporary biologists supported Moffett’s conclusions. No reports about the 
impact of Shasta Dam on salmon were published by the California Department of Fish and 
Game in the early fifties, so the problem seems to have become one of lesser concern after the 
dam was finished. 
It was not until 1950 that the five hydro electric generators at Shasta Dam came 
online.321 In June of that year a dedication ceremony, complete with a historical pageant, was 
held for the dam.322 
August 1, 1951, saw the start of “integrated workings of California’s Central Valley 
Project.”323 Finally all the components of the vast project would work together. A ten-day 
celebration was staged starting at Shasta Dam. The water released from the dam was dyed 
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bright green so it could be traced on its route south. Even as officials spoke at the opening, they 
discussed the need for more dams and more irrigated land but did not discuss salmon or other 
wildlife.324 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
In 1933 the California legislature passed the Central Valley Project Act, which authorized 
the construction of Shasta Dam, along with other water infrastructure. The Central Valley 
Project would move water from northern to southern California and also provide electric power 
and help control flooding. However, work on Shasta Dam did not begin until 1938. That same 
year USBF personal began a biological investigation into what would be necessary to salvage 
the salmon, whose life cycle would be affected by the dam. This schedule did not give biologists 
enough time to plan. In April of 1940 Hanson, Smith and Needham published the results of the 
investigation. They proposed three possible plans. In their report they talked about the 
monetary value of the fish but not the intrinsic value.  
The Bureau of Reclamation convened a Board of Consultants consisting of a biologist, an 
economist, and an engineer to read the report and decide on the best plan. The Board chose a 
plan close to the cheapest plan, involving a hatchery and three racks across the river to spread 
out the naturally spawning fish. The hatchery part of the plan was executed, and Coleman 
Hatchery is still in operation. However, the racks based on the natural river spawning part of 
the plan were never fully implemented and were quickly abandoned entirely. 
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In December 1943, the reservoir behind Shasta Dam began to fill. Reclamation 
engineers sought to drastically reduce outflows, which would negatively impact the salmon 
eggs laid that season. Sports fishers, commercial fishers and others sent telegrams to Secretary 
of the Interior Ickes to protest. This campaign was successful, and more water was released.  
In April of 1949 Dr James W. Moffet published “The First Four years of King Salmon 
Maintenance below Shasta Dam, Sacramento River, California” in California Fish and Game, the 
journal of the state Department of Fish and Game. In this article Moffet used more ecological 
concepts than previous reports. He was also quite optimistic about the effect of the dam on the 
salmon. 
After the completion of the Central Valley Project, the state of California began 
construction of the State Water Project in 1952. This project brought water from Shasta to the 
Los Angeles area, thus increasing the demand for water from the north. California continued to 
build large water projects until 1982 when plans to build a Peripheral Canal around the Delta 
were defeated at the ballot box. The idea of routing water around the Delta has not gone away, 
however, and the current governor of the state, Jerry Brown, is promoting a ballot measure in 
the November 2014 elections which would fund a tunnel pumping water through the Delta. The 
Central Valley Project forms the backbone of California’s water system today, and Shasta Dam 
remains important for water storage as well as for power generation.  
Coleman Hatchery remains in operation. The young fry are now held for months in pools 
with a current to better simulate their natural environment. However, very little of the hauling, 
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trapping and natural spawning parts of the Shasta Salvage Plan remain. In 1949, the hatchery 
was transferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service.325 
Red Bluff Diversion Dam, completed in 1964, had a major negative impact on fish 
because it blocked their passage upstream.326 The dam was located on the Sacramento River 
near the town of Red Bluff, and diverted water from the river for irrigation. After many years 
the dam’s removal is now currently in process.327 This change is predicted be good for salmon, 
as it will allow them to more easily reach their remaining habitat; the fish are the main reason 
the dam is being removed.  
It was not until the 1980s that the USFWS and the Bureau of Reclamation recognized 
that the Shasta Salvage Plan was not working.328 Before that time, elevated egg takes and high 
salmon catches convinced many that the effort was succeeding.329Under the Endangered 
Species Act, the Sacramento winter-run salmon population was listed as threatened in 1989 
and endangered in 1994.330 The Central Valley spring run, which includes all naturally spawning 
populations of salmon in the Sacramento, was listed as endangered in 1999.331 
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The 1992 Central Valley Improvement Act provided for the protection, restoration and 
enhancement of fish in the whole Central Valley watershed including the Delta and the Bay. 
This law brought the focus of restoration efforts back towards natural river spawning and 
focused on habitat restoration and removing barriers.332 In a time with much stronger 
environmental values, the new laws reflected a major change in public opinion.  
In the 1990s Shasta Dam was reworked so that water is at the correct temperature for 
salmon downstream. A secondary structure that allows monitoring the temperature and 
moving the depth of the intake was put in so that water entering the power plant would be the 
correct temperature. This was a problem that was known when the dam was built, but it was 
not addressed until many years later, following a broader change in environmental values in the 
United States.  
In 2006 environmental groups settled a lawsuit against the Bureau of Reclamation; this 
decision means that more water will be returned to the San Joaquin River, which was often dry 
due to irrigation demands.333 However, since that time progress has been slow. With the 
current drought in California, this settlement is being challenged. Today, the Central Valley’s 
salmon population remains in poor shape. The population has declined since the Central Valley 
Project was completed. The current drought could also damage the fish. Low water levels in 
2013 mean that recent hatches of smolts may have trouble reaching the sea.  
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Shasta Dam was built during a transition period between the Hetch Hetchy and Echo 
Park dams (moving towards a more intrinsic idea of nature’s values). Needham may have 
valued salmon intrinsically, but he never explicitly said so. No clear congruence emerged 
between engineers and biologists on these issues. Both biologists and engineers talked about 
monetary values of the fish. Only Hedgpeth came out and claimed he valued the fish for their 
own sake.  
The 1930s and 1940s were a time when environmental activism focused more on 
bureaucratic reform than on creating new laws. We see this in the Central Valley Project where 
many people worked from within the system to try and help the salmon. The telegram 
campaign composed primarily of sports fishers focused on changing the choices of regulators, 
so that they would release enough water for the salmon, rather than creating new regulations.  
Willingness to rearrange natural systems was common in both engineers working for 
human benefits and biologists working for the benefit of fish. The engineers wanted to change 
the watershed to irrigate more land, control flooding and generate power. However the 
biologists were also willing to rearrange natural systems to meet their goals. For example, the 
Stillwater plan required building a canal to supply water to a stream that was dry in the 
summer, and Coleman Hatchery was ready to accept an extensive rearrangement of the 
salmon’s lifecycle.  
What we see here is that there is not a watershed moment, no clear turning point along 
the way to a new view of the Sacramento River salmon. We can see the beginnings of the 
environmental movement in Hedgpeth’s activism and the telegram campaign to release water 
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from Shasta for the fish. We also see it in the concern other scientists displayed for the salmon. 
Needham was not required by his job to create a publicity campaign, and his doing so suggests 
a deep sense of ethical obligation regarding the fish. Historical movements such as the 
environmental movement are made in small steps, incremental changes in how people think. 
The story of the Sacramento River salmon reveals the incremental shifts in an industrialized 
society’s understanding of wildlife, of human uses of the landscape, and in policy. Important 
themes that emerged from this study of the Shasta Salvage Project include, incrementalism, an 
understanding of how ecology influenced New Deal era planning, and how people’s 
environmental values affect the outcomes of projects. 
Planning happens on many scales. While most planners and planning historians focus on 
planning cities, large scale infrastructure projects like the Central Valley Project are also part of 
planning and have significant impact on the landscape. The New Deal, which funded the Central 
Valley Project, was typical of Federal Planning, which significantly built up dams used for power 
and irrigation in the western U.S. The Central Valley Project moved California toward a more 
input intensive agriculture, focusing on irrigated fruit and vegetable crops. 
The Central Valley Project is also relevant to planning because it reminds us that plans 
are not just written documents. The Shasta Salmon Salvage Plan was written using the best 
biological data available at the time. Yet the plan was not executed as written, and many pieces 
of it were never put into practice. Once plans are written, other factors such as time, money 
and values can affect how well they are implemented.   
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As we look at the Shasta Salmon Salvage Project, we see the beginnings of a transition in 
people’s thinking from conservation to environmentalism. In this thesis I have closely examined 
people whose viewpoints fit into a continuum between these styles of viewing nature. Page, 
Bashore, and some reclamation engineers tended towards the conservation viewpoint focused 
on the needs of humans; when they think salmon should be saved, it is because of their 
extrinsic values. Hedgpeth was a biologist but also an environmentalist who valued salmon 
intrinsically. Needham and the other biologists mostly fell between these two ways of seeing. 
They clearly valued the salmon, but only expressed this value in monetary terms. Nonetheless, I 
believe they also intrinsically valued the salmon to some extent, but did not feel that they could 
say so in a professional context. These biologists wanted the fish to have the best chance. Smith 
talked about how saving them was an “obvious” course of action. Needham helped organize 
the telegram campaign, which successfully fought for more water. These men constantly put 
forth more effort than was justified by the monetary value of the fish.  
While I believe that history proceeds in a process of incremental changes, no one in this 
story changed their mind. Instead, we see change happening because younger people have 
somewhat different values than older people, for example, Hedgpeth’s strong activism or 
Moffet’s more ecological viewpoint. Hedgpeth wrote many articles in defense of the salmon, 
and believed in and clearly stated their intrinsic value. Moffet was less of an activist, but his 
1949 report uses ecological language, and seems like a shift in paradigm from earlier reports on 
the salmon. We also see change as biologists become better at explaining their views to the 
public. In fact the public having a more direct say, and in some cases overriding the expert 
opinion, also represents major change. The telegram campaign in December 1943, waged by 
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sports fishing organizations and others concerned about the salmon, was an early example of 
environmental activism. 
Overall, how people valued salmon significantly impacted the outcome of the Shasta 
Salmon Salvage Project. The fact that the fish were seen as primarily of commercial importance 
led to them being overlooked. Much more could have been done for the salmon. Even the 
salvage plan as written was never fully tried, though it is unclear that it would have worked. 
Had Reclamation taken a more holistic view of salmon and the dam, the fish might be in much 
better shape today. 
Change does happen, but slowly, with long periods building up to what can seem like 
watershed moments. Peoples’ values and ways of looking at nature can have real consequences 
for the natural world. In this story economic values and people who saw nature as a means to 
an end mostly controlled the fate of the salmon. Nonetheless, there are still salmon in the 
Great Central Valley. Over time, those who value the fish intrinsically have gained more say in 
what happens to salmon. Though the population has declined, perhaps if such values continue 
to be articulated we can reverse their decline.  
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